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


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INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Vol. II

MAX MÜLLER



VEDANTA AND PURVA-MIMAMSA

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

BY

F. MAX MULLER

VOLUME ONE

THE SIX SYSTEMS

VOLUME TWO

VEDANTA AND PURVA-MIMAMSA

VOLUME THREE

SAMKHYA AND YOGA

VOLUME FOUR

NAYA AND VAISESHIKA

VEDANTA AND PURVA-MIMAMSA

BY
FRIEDRICH MAX MÜLLER

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FRIEDRICH MAX MULLER

Born in Germany December 6, 1823, at Dessau : educated in Leipzig from the year 1841; received his Ph.D. in 1843; studied under the great Sanskrit scholars, Bopp and Schelling, at Berlin, and under Eugene Burnouf at Paris; came to England in 1846; was commissioned by the Directors of the East India Company to edit the Rigveda, with Sayana's commentary; lived at Oxford from 1848; Deputy, and, in 1854, substantive Taylorian Professor of European Languages; Curator of the Bodleian Library of Oxford, 1856; became Fellow of All Souls' in 1858; failed to obtain the Sanskrit Professorship at Oxford, 1860; first Professor of Comparative Philology from 1860; made researches in comparative mythology and the comparative study of religions; originated and edited from 1875 the series "Sacred Books of the East", 51 volumes of translations of Oriental religious works; brought out various Sanskrit works and delivered many lectures, and helped Sanskrit scholars; literary adviser to Oxford University on Indian subjects, 1877—1898; Privy Councillor, and received many honours from Governments, Universities, and learned bodies, was a leading member in Oriental Congresses, and President of the International Congress of Orientalists, 1892; distinguished also for his great literary and social qualities; was greatly loved and admired in India; died at Oxford, October 28, 1900; a fund was raised to perpetuate his memory at Oxford by providing for the promotion of Oriental learning and research.

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CHAPTER IV

Vedanta or Uttara-Mimamsa

If now we pass on to a consideration of the six orthodox systems of philosophy, and begin with the Vedanta, we have to take as our chief guides the Sūtras of Bādarāyana, and the commentary of Saṃkara. We know little of Bādarāyana, the reputed author of the Sūtras. Of course when we possess commentaries on any Sūtras, we know that the Sūtras must have existed before their commentaries, that the Sūtras of Bādarāyana were older therefore than Saṃkara, their commentator. In India he has been identified with Vyasa, the collector of the Mahābhārata, but without sufficient evidence, nor should we gain much by that identification, as Vyasa of the Mahābhārata also is hardly more than a name to us. This Vyasa is said by Saṃkara, III, 3, 32, to have lived at the end of the Dvāpara and the beginning of the Kali age, and to have had intercourse with the gods, I. c., I, 3, 33. But though he calls him the author of the Mahābhārata, I. c., II, 3, 47, Saṃkara, in the whole of his commentary on the Vedānta-Sūtras, never mentions that the Vyasa of the epic was the author of the book on which he is commenting, though he mentions Bādarāyana as such. This convinced Windischmann that Saṃkara himself did not consider these two Vyāsas as one and the same person, and this judgment ought not to have been lightly disturbed. It was excusable in Colebrooke, but not after what had been said by Windischmann, particularly when no new argument could be produced. All we can say is that, whatever the date of the Bhagavad-gītā is, and it is a part of the Mahābhārata, the age of the Vedānta-Sūtras and of Bādarāyana must have been earlier.

We may also say that Bādarāyana himself never refers to any work which could be assigned with any amount of certainty to any time after our era. Even when Bādarāyana quotes the Smṛiti, it does not follow that Saṃkara is always right when suggesting passages from the Mahābhārata (Bhagavad-gītā), or from Manu, for it is not too much to

say that similar passages may have occurred in other and more ancient Smṛiti works also. Badarayana is certainly most provoking in never quoting his authorities by name. If we could follow Saṅkara, Badarayana would have referred in his Sūtras to Baudhdhas, Jainas, Paśupatas and Pancharātras, to Yogins, Vaiśeṣikas, though not to Naiyāyikas, to Saṅkhya, and to the doctrines of Jaimini¹. By the name of Śruti Badarayana, according to Saṅkara, meant the following Upanishads, Bṛihad-aranyaka, Chāndogya, Kathaka, Kauṣhitaki, Aitareya, Taittiriya, Mundaka, Prasna, Svetasvatara, and Jabala.

This must suffice to indicate the intellectual sphere in which Badarayana moved, or was supposed to have moved, and so far may be said to determine his chronological position as far anterior to that of another Vyasa, who was the father of Suka, the teacher of Gaudapada, the teacher of Govinda, the teacher of Saṅkara, and who, if Saṅkara belonged to the eighth century, might have lived in about the sixth century of our era².

The literary works to which Saṅkara refers in his commentary are, according to Deussen (*System*, p. 34), among the Samhitas, that of the Rīg-veda, of the Vajasaneyins, Maitrayaniyas and Taittiriyas, and Kathas (nothing from the Sama and Atharva-samhitas); among the Brahmanas, the Aitareya, Arsheya, Shadvimsa, Satapatha, Taittiriya, Tandya, Chhandogya; among the Aranyakas, Aitareya and Taittiriya; and among the Upanishads, Aitareya Bṛihad-aranyaka, Isa, Katha, Kauṣhitaki-brahmana, Kena, Chhandogya, Maitrayaniya, Mundaka, Prasna, Svetasvatara, Taittiriya. These are sometimes called the old or classical Upanishads, as being quoted by Saṅkara, though, Paingī, Agnirahasya, Narayaniya and Jabala may have to be added. As belonging to Smṛiti Saṅkara quotes Mahābhārata (Bhagavad-gīta), Rāmāyana, Markandeya-purāna, Manu, Yaska, Pāṇini, Paribhashas, Saṅkhya-karika, and he refers to Saṅkhya-Sūtras (though it is important to observe that

¹ Deussen, *System des Vedanta*, p. 24.

² Another stemma of Vyasa, given by native writers, is Narayana, Vasishtha (Padmabhava), Sakti, Parasara, Vyasa, Suka, Gaudapada, Hastamalaka (Sishya), Trotaka, Varttikakara, &c.

he gives no *ipsissima verba* from our Samkhya-Sutras,) to Yoga-Sutras, Nyaya-Sutras, Vaisesika-Sutras, and to Mimamsa-Sutras. When he alludes to Sugata or Buddha he refers once to a passage which has been traced in the Abhidharma-Kosha-vyakhya. He also knew the Bhagavatas and the Svapnadhyavids.

Though the name of Vedanta does not occur in the old Upanishads, we can hardly doubt that it was the Vedantic thoughts, contained in the Upanishads, which gave the first impulse to more systematic philosophical speculations in India. Several scholars have tried to prove that Samkhya ideas prevailed in India at an earlier time than the Vedantic ideas. But though there certainly are germs of Samkhya theories in the Upanishads, they are but few and far between, while the strictly Vedantic concepts meet us at every step in the hymns, the Brahmanas, the Aranyakas and in the Sutras. Vedanta is clearly the native philosophy of India. It is true that this philosophy is not yet treated systematically in the Upanishads, but neither is the Samkhya. To us who care only for the growth of philosophical thought on the ancient soil of India, Vedanta is clearly the first growth; and the question whether Kapila lived before Badarayana, or whether the systematic treatment of the Samkhya took place before that of the Vedanta, can hardly arise.

I only wonder that those who maintain the priority of the Samkhya, have not appealed to the Lalita-vistara, twelfth chapter, where, among the subjects known to Buddha, are mentioned not only Nirghantu, Khandas, Yajnakalpa, Jyotisha, but likewise Samkhya, Yoga, Vaisesika Vesika (Vaidyaka?), Arthavidya, Barhaspatya, Ascharya, Asura, Mrigapakshiruta, and Hetuvidya (Nyaya). There are several names which are difficult to identify, but there can be no doubt that the five philosophical systems here mentioned were intended for Samkhya, Yoga, Vaisesika, Nyaya, and Barhaspatya. The two Mimamsas are absent, but their absence does not prove that they did not exist, but only that they were considered too orthodox to form a proper subject of study for Buddha. This shows the real character of the antagonism between Buddhism and

Brahmanism, now so often denied or minimised¹, and is confirmed by similar references, as when Hemachandra in his *Abhidhana* mentions indeed such names as Arhatas or Jainas, Saugatas or Buddhists, Naiyayikas, Yoga, Samkhya or Kapila, Vaisesika, Barhaspatya or Nastika, Charvaka or Lokayatika, but carefully omits the two really dangerous systems, the Mimamsa of Badarayana and that of Jaimini.

It should also be remembered that considerable doubt has recently been thrown on the age of the Chinese translation of the *Lalita-vistara*, which seemed to enable us to assign the original to a date at all events anterior to 70 A.D. The case is not quite clear yet, but we must learn to be more cautious with Chinese dates.

It has been the custom to give the name of Vedanta-philosophy to the Uttara-Mimamsa of Badarayana, nor is there any reason why that name should not be retained. If Vedanta is used as synonymous with Upanishad, the Uttara-Mimamsa is certainly the Vedanta-philosophy, or a systematic treatment of the philosophical teaching of the Upanishads. It is true, no doubt, that Vasishtha as well as Gautama distinguishes between Upanishads and Vedantas (XXII, 9), and the commentator to Gautama XIX, 7 states distinctly that those parts only of the Aranyakas which are not Upanishads are to be called Vedantas. But there is no real harm in the received name, and we see that the followers of the Vedanta were often called Aupanishadas.

Badarayana

As to Badarayana, the reputed author of the Vedanta-Sutras, we had to confess before that we know nothing about him. He is to us a name and an intellectual power, but nothing else. We know the date of his great commentator, Samkara, in the eighth century A.D., and we know that another commentator, Bodhayana, was even earlier. We also know that Bodhayana's commentary was followed by Ramanuja. It is quite possible that Bodhayana, like Ramanuja, represented a more ancient and more faithful

¹ See *Brahmavadin*, Feb., 1898, p. 454.

interpretation of Badarayana's Sūtras, and that Sāṅkara's philosophy in its unflinching monism, is his own rather than Badarayana's. But no MS. of Bodhayana has yet been discovered.

A still more ancient commentator, Upavarsha by name, is mentioned, and Sāṅkara (III, 3, 53) calls him Bhagavad or Saint. But it must remain doubtful again whether he can be identified with the Upavarsha, who, according to the *Katha-sarit-sagara*, was the teacher of Panini.

It must not be forgotten that, according to Indian tradition, Badarayana, as the author of the *Vedānta-Sūtras*, is called Vyasa or Vedavyasa, Dvaipayana or Krishna Dvaipayana. Here we are once more in a labyrinth from which it is difficult to find an exit. Vyasa or Krishna Dvaipayana is the name given to the author of the *Mahābhārata*, and no two styles can well be more different than that of the Vyasa of the *Mahābhārata* and that of Vyasa, the supposed author of the so-called *Vyasa-Sūtras*. I think we should remember that Vyasa, as a noun, meant no more than compilation or arrangement, as opposed to Samasa, conciseness or abbreviation; so that the same story might be recited Samasena, in an abbreviated, and Vyasena in a complete form.

We should remember next that Vyasa is called Parasarya, the son of Parasara and Satyavati (truthful), and that Panini mentions one Parasarya as the author of the *Bhikṣu-Sūtras*, while Vachaspati Miśra declares that the *Bhikṣu-Sūtras* are the same as the *Vedānta-Sūtras*, and that the followers of Parasarya were in consequence called Parasarins. (Pan. IV, 3, 110).

This, if we could rely on it, would prove the existence of our Sūtras before the time of Panini, or in the fifth century B.C. This would be a most important gain for the chronology of Indian philosophy. But if, as we are told, Vyasa collected (*Vivasya*) not only the Vedas, the *Mahābhārata*, the *Purāṇas*, but also the *Vyasa-Sūtras*, nay even a prose commentary on Patanjali's *Yoga-Sūtras*, we can hardly doubt that the work ascribed to him must be taken as the work of several people or of a literary period rather than of one man. I formerly thought that Vyasa might have represented the period in which the first attempts

were made to reduce the ancient mnemonic literature of India to writing, but there is nothing in tradition to support such a view, unless we thought that Vyasa had some connexion with Nyasa (writing). Indian tradition places the great Vyasa between the third and fourth ages of the present world, whatever that may mean, if translated into our modern chronological language. If Vyasa had really anything to do with our Vedanta-Sutras, it would hardly have been more than that he arranged or edited them. His name does not occur in the Sutras themselves, while that of Badarayana does, and likewise that of Badari, a name mentioned by Jaimini also in his *Purva-Mimamsa*¹. In the Bhagavad-gita, which might well be placed as contemporary with the Vedanta-Sutras, or somewhat later, Vyasa is mentioned as one of the Devarshis with Asita and Devala (X, 13), and he is called the greatest of Rishis (X, 37). But all becomes confusion again, if we remember that tradition makes Vyasa the author of the Mahabharata, and therefore of the Bhagavad-gita itself, which is even called an Upanishad.

The only passage which seems to me to settle the relative age of the Vedanta-Sutras and the Bhagavad-gita is in XIII, 3², 'Hear and learn from me the Supreme Soul (Kshetrajna) that has been celebrated in many ways by Rishis in various metres, and by the words of the *Brahma-Sutras*, which are definite and furnished with reasons.' Here the words 'Brahma-Sutra-padaih,' 'the words of the Brahma-Sutras,' seem to me to refer clearly to the recognised title of the Vedanta or Brahma-Sutras. Whatever native authorities may say to the contrary, the words 'definite and argumentative' can refer to Sutras only. And if it is said, on the other side, that these Brahma-Sutras, when they refer to Smriti, refer clearly to passages taken from the Bhagavad-gita also, and must therefore be later, I doubt it. They never mention the name of the Bhagavad-gita, nor do they give any *ipsissima verba* from it, and as every Smriti presupposes a Sruti, these references may have been meant for passages which the Bhagavad-

¹ Colebrooke, M. E., II, p. 354.

² Prof. T. R. Amalnerkar, *Priority of the Vedanta-Sutras*, 1895.

gita had adapted, and may have shared with other Smritis. *Brahma-Sutra*, on the contrary, is a distinct title, all the more significant where it occurs, because neither the word *Sutra* nor *Brahma-Sutra* occurs again in any other passage of the *Gita*. However, even admitting that the *Brahma-Sutras* quoted from the *Bhagavad-gita*, as the *Gita* certainly appeals to the *Brahma-Sutras*, this reciprocal quotation might be accounted for by their being contemporaneous, as in the case of other *Sutras* which, as there can be no doubt, quote one from the other, and sometimes verbatim.

As to the commentary on Patanjali's *Yoga-Sutras* being the work of the same Vyasa, this seems to me altogether out of the question. There are hundreds of people in India who have the name of Vyasa. Nor has it ever been positively proved that Patanjali, the reputed author of the *Yoga-Sutras*, was the same person as Patanjali, the author of the *Mahabhashya*, the great commentary on Panini's grammar, and on Katyayana's *Varttikas*. Some scholars have rushed at this conclusion, chiefly in order to fix the date of the *Yoga-Sutras*, but this also would force us to ascribe the most heterogeneous works to one and the same author¹.

Even the age of Patanjali, the grammarian and author of the *Mahabhashya*, seems to me by no means positively settled. I gladly admit the plausibility of Goldstucker's arguments that if Patanjali presupposed the existence of the Maurya-dynasty he might be placed in the third century B.C. I look upon the Archah, which he mentions in the famous Maurya-passage, as having been devised by the Mauryas for the sake of trade, as the first coins with images of the gods, introduced by the Maurya-dynasty. Such coins, when they contain images of the gods, should not, according to the grammarian, be called simply by the names of the gods, but by a derivative name, not *Siva*, but *Sivaka*, just as we distinguish between an Angel and an Angelot. And I pointed out before, the very gods mentioned here by Patanjali are the gods the images of which do occur on the oldest Indian coins which we possess, viz.

¹ Both Lassen and Garbe, *Die Samkhya-Philosophie*, p. 46, seem inclined to accept the identity of the two Patanjalis.

Siva, Skanda, and Visakha, the last, if taken for Kama. As a constructive date therefore, that assigned by Goldstucker to Patanjali might stand, but that is very different from a positive date. Besides, the name of Maurya in the Mahabhashya is doubtful and does not occur again in it.

We saw before that Badarayana refers in his Sutras to Jaimini, the author of the Purva-Mimamsa-Sutras, and that Jaimini returns the compliment by referring to Badarayana by name. Badarayana is likewise acquainted with the atheistical doctrines of Kapila and the atomistic theories of Kanada, and tries to refute them. But in India this is far from proving the later date of Badarayana. We must learn to look on Badarayana, Jaimini, Kapila, and similar names, as simply eponymous heroes of different philosophies; so that at whatever time these systems were reduced to the form of Sutras, certain opinions could be called by their names. Colebrooke states, on the authority of a scholiast to Manu and Yajnavalkya, that the instructions of a teacher were often reduced to writing by his pupils, and that this would account for the fact that the author of a system is often quoted in the third person in his own book. It would be interesting if this could be established with reference to ancient texts, but I remember nothing of the kind. All this is very discouraging to students accustomed to chronological accuracy, but it has always seemed to me far better to acknowledge our poverty and the utter absence of historical dates in the literary history of India, than to build up systems after systems which collapse at the first breath of criticism or scepticism.

When I speak of a chronology of thought, what I mean is that there is a chronology which enables us to distinguish a period of Vedic thought, subdivided into three periods of Mantras, Brahmanas, and Upanishads. No one would doubt the succession of these three periods of language, but if some scholars desire to extend each period to thousands of years, I can only wish them success. I confess I do not share the idea that we should claim for Indian literature as remote an antiquity as possible. The same attempts were made before, but nothing was gained by them, and much was lost as soon as more sober and critical ideas began to prevail. After the Upanishad-period would follow

that of Buddhism, marked, on the Buddhist side, by the Suttas, on the Brahmanic side, and possibly somewhat earlier, by the large mass of Sutra literature. To that period seem to me to belong, by similarity of thought, if not of style, the six systems of philosophy. I should have said by style also, because the earliest form in which we possess these systems is that of Sutrās. Unfortunately we know now how easily even that very peculiar style can be, and in case of the Samkhya and some of the legal Smritis, has been imitated. We must not therefore ascribe too much weight to this. The next period would be what I have called that of the Renaissance, beginning at a time when Sanskrit had ceased to be the language spoken by the people, though it continued, as it has to the present day, to be cultivated by the learned.

Such are the difficulties that meet us when we attempt to introduce anything like chronological order into the literature of India, and it seems to me far better to state them honestly than to disguise them. After all, the importance of that literature, and more particularly of its philosophical portion, is quite independent of age. It has something to teach us quite apart from the names and dates of its authors ; and grateful as we should feel for any real light that can be thrown on these chronological mazes, we must not forget that the highest interest of the Vedānta and the other philosophies is not their age, but their truth.

Fundamental Doctrines of the Vedānta

If we ask for the fundamental doctrines of the Vedānta, the Hindus themselves have helped us and given us in a few words what they themselves consider as the quintessence of that system of thought. I quoted these words at the end of my 'Three Lectures on the Vedānta' (1894) :

'In one half verse I shall tell you what has been taught in thousands of volumes : Brahman is true, the world is false, the soul is Brahman and nothing else¹.'

And again :

'There is nothing worth gaining, there is nothing worth enjoying, there is nothing worth knowing but Brahman alone, for he who knows Brahman, is Brahman.'

¹ See also Theosophy, p. 317.

This *resume* of the Vedanta is very true, and very helpful as a *resume* of that system of philosophy. After all we must distinguish in every philosophy its fundamental doctrines and its minute details. We can never carry all these details in our memory, but we may always have present before our mind the general structure of a great system of thought and its salient points, whether it be the philosophy of Kant or of Plato or of Badarayana. It would be quite impossible in a historical sketch of the six Indian philosophical systems to give all their details. They are often unimportant, and may easily be gathered from the texts themselves, such as we have them in the original or in translations ; but they must not be allowed to crowd and to obscure that general view of the six systems which alone is meant to be given in these pages.

We have another and still shorter abstract of the Vedanta in the famous words addressed by Uddalaka Aruni to his son Svetaketu (Chhand. Up. VI, 8), namely, 'Tat tvam asi,' 'Thou art That.' These words, however, convey little meaning without the context in which they occur, that is to say, unless we know what is meant by the Tat, that, and by the Tvam, thou. The Tat is what we saw shadowed forth in the Upanishads as the Brahman, as the cause of the world, the Tvam is the Atman, the Self in its various meanings, from the ordinary I to the divine Soul or Self, recognised in man ; and it is the highest aim of the Vedanta to show that these two are in reality one¹. This fearless synthesis, embodied in the simple words Tat tvam asi, seems to me the holdest and truest synthesis in the whole history of philosophy. Even Kant, who clearly recognised the Tat or it, that is the *Ding an sich* behind the objective world, never went far enough to recognise the identity of the Tat, the objective *Ding an sich*, and the Tvam, the *Ding an sich* on the subjective side of the world. Among ourselves such a synthesis of the subjective with the objective Self would even now rouse the strongest theological, if not philosophical, protests, whereas the theologians of India discuss it with perfect equanimity, and see in it the truest solution of the riddle of the world. In order fully to understand it, we must try to place our-

¹ Mandukya Up. II, Ayam Atma Brahma.

selves firmly on the standpoint of the Vedanta philosophers, forgetting all our own inherited theological misgivings. Their idea of the Supreme Cause of the universe went far beyond what is meant by God, the creator and ruler of the world (Prajapati). That being was to them a manifestation only of the Supreme Cause or Brahman, it was Brahman as phenomenal, and it followed that, as Brahman, as they held, was indeed the cause of everything, the All in All, man also could be nothing but a phenomenon of Brahman. The idea therefore that it would be blasphemy to make the creature equal to the creator so far as their substance was concerned, never presented itself to their minds. Their Tat was something behind or above the purely personal creator, it was the absolute divine essence, the Godhead, manifested in a subjective and personal creator, and present likewise in all its phenomenal manifestations, including gods and men. Even their god beyond all gods (Deveshu adhi ekah) did not satisfy them any longer, as it did in the hymns of the Rig-veda; and though they might have shrunk from identifying gods and men with that personal divine being, Prajapati, the lord of all creatures, they saw nothing but truth in the doctrine that man in his true nature was the same with Brahman, that he shares in the nature of Brahman, or in the spirit of God. They saw, in fact, that God is hardly a name that can be used for that Supreme Brahman, the absolute Cause of the universe, and the absolute Cause of Prajapati also, when taken as the creative god. I say when taken as such, for we ought never to forget that we have always to be satisfied with what we take God to be (Vidyamatra), and that we can never go beyond. Translated into the language of the early Christian philosophers of Alexandria, this lifting up of the Tvam into the Tat might prove the equivalent of the idea of divine sonship, but from the Vedanta point of view it means real identity, real recognition of the original divine nature of man, however much hidden and disfigured for a time by Avidya, or ignorance, and all its consequences. With us unfortunately such questions can hardly be discussed in a calm philosophical spirit, because theology steps in and protests against them as irreligious and blasphemous, just as the Jews declared

it blasphemy in Christ to teach that He was equal to God, nay that He and the Father were one, *Tat tvam asi*. If properly understood, these Vedanta teachings may, though under a strange form, bring us very near to the earliest Christian philosophy, and help us to understand it, as it was understood by the great thinkers of Alexandria. To maintain the eternal identity of the human and the divine is very different from arrogating divinity for humanity; and on this point even our philosophy may have something to learn which has often been forgotten in modern Christianity, though it was recognised as vital by the early fathers of the Church, the unity of the Father and the Son, nay, of the Father and all His sons.

The teachers of the Vedanta, while striving to resuscitate in man the consciousness of the identity of the *Tat* and the *Tvam*, and, though indirectly, of man and God, seem to be moving in the most serene atmosphere of thought, and in their stiff and algebraic Sutras they were working out these mighty problems with unfaltering love of truth, and in an unimpassioned and truly philosophic spirit.

It is as difficult to give an idea of the form of the Upanishads as of the spirit that pervades the Upanishads. A few extracts, however, may help to show us the early Vedantists as they were, groping their way in the dark. We do not indeed get there the pure wine of the Vedanta, but we get the grapes from which the juice was extracted and made into wine. The first is taken from the *Chhandogya* Upanishad which belongs to the *Sama-veda* and is generally regarded as one of the earlier Upanishads¹.

FIRST KHANDA

1. Svetaketu was the son of Aruni, the grandson of Aruna. To him his father (Uddalaka, the son of Aruna) said: Svetaketu, go to school; for there is none belonging to our race, darling, who, not having studied (the Veda), is, as it were, a *Brahma-bandhu*, i.e. a Brahmana by birth only.²

2. Having begun his apprenticeship (with a teacher) when he was twelve years of age, Svetaketu returned to his

¹ Translated in S. B. E., I, p. 92.

father, when he was twenty-four, having then studied all the Vedas,—conceited, considering himself well-read, and stubborn.

3. His father said to him : 'Svetaketu, as you are so conceited, considering yourself well-read, and so stubborn, my dear son, have you ever asked for that instruction by which we hear what is not heard, by which we perceive what is not perceived, by which we know what is not known ?'

4. 'What is that instruction, Sir ?' he asked.

The father replied : 'My dear son, as by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, the difference being only the name, arising from speech, but the truth being that all is clay ;

5. 'And as, my dear son, by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is known, the difference being only the name, arising from speech, but the truth being that all is gold ;

6. 'And as, my dear son, by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of steel (*Karshnayasaṃ*) is known the difference being only the name, arising from speech, but the truth being that all is steel,—thus, my dear son, is that instruction.'

7. 'The son said : 'Surely those venerable men (my teachers) did not know that. For if they had known it, why should they not have told it me ? Do you, Sir therefore tell me that.' 'Be it so,' said the father.

SECOND KHANDA

1. 'In the beginning, my dear son, there was that only which is (*to on*) one only, without a second. Others say, in the beginning there was that only which is not (*to me on*) one only, without a second ; and from that which is not, that which is, was born.

2. 'But how could it be so, my dear son ?' the father continued. 'How could that which is, be born of that which is not ? No, my dear son, only that which is, was in the beginning, one only, without a second.

3. 'It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire.

'That fire thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth water.

'And therefore whenever anybody anywhere is hot and perspires, water is produced on him from fire alone.

4. 'Water thought, may I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth earth (food).

'Therefore whenever it rains anywhere, most food is then produced. From water alone is eatable food produced.

SEVENTH KHANDA

1. 'Man (Purusha), my son, consists of sixteen parts. Abstain from food for fifteen days, but drink as much water as you like, for breath comes from water, and will not be cut off, if you drink water.'

2. Svetaketu abstained from food for fifteen days. Then he came to his father and said: 'What shall I say?' The father said: 'Repeat the Rik, Yajus, and Saman verses.' He replied: 'They do not occur to me, Sir.'

3. The father said to him: 'As of a great lighted fire one coal only of the size of a firefly may be left, which would not burn much more than this (i.e. very little), thus, my dear son, one part only of the sixteen parts (of you) is left, and therefore with that one part you do not remember the Vedas. Go and eat!

4. 'Then wilt thou understand me.' Then Svetaketu ate, and afterwards approached his father. And whatever his father asked him, he knew it all by heart. Then his father said to him:

5. 'As of a great lighted fire one coal of the size of a firefly, if left, may be made to blaze up again by putting grass upon it, and will thus burn more than this.

6. 'Thus, my dear son, there was one part of the sixteen parts left to you, and that, lighted up with food, burnt up, and by it you remember now the Vedas.' After that, he understood what his father meant when he said: 'Mind, my son, comes from food, breath from water, speech from fire.' He understood what he said, yea, he understood it.

NINTH KHANDA

1. 'As the bees, my son, make honey by collecting the

juices of distant trees, and reduce the juices into one form,

2. 'And as these juices have no discrimination, so that they might say, I am the juice of this tree or that, in the same manner, my son, all these creatures, when they have become merged in the True (either in deep sleep or in death), know not that they are merged in the True.

3. 'Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a mosquito, that they become again and again.

4. 'Now that which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its Self. It is the True. It is the Self, and thou, O Svetaketu, art it.'

'Please, Sir, inform me still more,' said the son.

'Be it so, my child,' the father replied.

TENTH KHANDA

1. 'These rivers, my son, run, the eastern (like the Ganga) toward the east, the western (like the Sindhu) towards the west. They go from sea to sea (i.e. the clouds lift up the water from the sea to the sky, and send it back as rain to the sea). They become indeed sea. And as those rivers, when they are in the sea, do not know, I am this or that river,

2. 'In the same manner, my son, all these creatures, when they have come back from the True, know not that they have come back from the True. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, or a midge, or a gnat, or a mosquito, that they become again and again.

3. 'That which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its Self. It is the True. It is the Self, and thou, O Svetaketu, art it.'

'Please, Sir, inform me still more,' said the son.

'Be it so, my child,' the father replied.

ELEVENTH KHANDA

1. 'If one were to strike at the root of this large tree here, it would bleed, but it would live. If he were to strike at its stem, it would bleed, but it would live. If he were to strike at its top, it would bleed, but it would live. Per-

vaded by the living Self that tree stands firm, drinking in its nourishment and rejoicing ;

2. 'But if the life (the living Self) leaves one of its branches, that branch withers ; if it leaves a second, that branch withers ; if it leaves a third, that branch withers. If it leaves the whole tree, the whole tree withers. In exactly the same manner, my son, know this.' Thus he spoke :

3. 'This (body) indeed withers and dies when the living (Self) has left it ; the living (Self) dies not.

'That which is that subtle essence, in it all that exists has its Self. It is the True. It is the Self, and thou, Svetaketu, art it.'

'Please, Sir, inform me still more,' said the son.

'Be it so, my child,' the father replied.

TWELFTH KHANDA

1. 'Fetch me from thence a fruit of the Nyagrodha tree.'

'Here is one, Sir.'

'Break it.'

'It is broken, Sir.'

'What do you see there ?'

'These seeds, almost infinitesimal.'

'Break one of them.'

'It is broken, Sir.'

'What do you see there ?'

'Not anything, Sir.'

2. The father said : 'My son, that subtle essence which you do not perceive there, of that very essence this great Nyagrodha tree exists.

3. 'Believe it, my son. That which is the subtle essence, in it all that exists has its Self. It is the True. It is the Self, and thou, O Svetaketu, art it.'

'Please, Sir, inform me still more,' said the son.

'Be it so, my child,' the father replied.

THIRTEENTH KHANDA

1. 'Place this salt in water, and then wait on me in the morning.'

The son did as he was commanded.

The father said to him: 'Bring me the salt, which you placed in the water last night.'

The son, having looked for it, found it not, for, of course, it was melted.

2. The father said: 'Taste it from the surface of the water. How is it?'

The son replied: 'It is salt.'

'Taste it from the middle. How is it?'

The son replied: 'It is salt.'

'Taste it from the bottom. How is it?'

The son replied: 'It is salt.'

The father said: 'Throw it away and then wait on me.'

He did so; but the salt continued to exist.

Then the father said: 'Here also, in this body, indeed, you do not perceive the True (Sat), my son; but there indeed it is.'

3. 'That which is the subtle essence, in it all that exists has its Self. It is the True. It is the Self, and thou, O Svetaketu, art it.'

'Please, Sir, inform me still more,' said the son.

'Be it so, my child,' the father replied.

FOURTEENTH KHANDA

1. 'As one might lead a person with his eyes covered away from the Gandharas, and leave him then in a place where there are no human beings; and as that person would turn towards the east, or the north, or the west, and shout, "I have been brought here with my eyes covered, I have been left here with my eyes covered."

2. 'And as thereupon some one might loose his bandage and say to him, "Go in that direction, it is the Gandharas, go in that direction;" and as thereupon, having been informed and being able to judge for himself, he would by asking his way from village to village arrive at last at the Gandharas,—in exactly the same manner does a man, who meets with a teacher to inform him, learn that there is delay so long only as "I am not delivered (from this body); and then I shall be perfect."

3. 'That which is the subtle essence, in it all that exists has its Self. It is the True. It is the Self, and thou, O Svetaketu, art it.'

'Please, Sir, inform me still more,' said the son.
'Be it so, my child,' the father replied.

FIFTEENTH KHANDA

1. 'If a man is ill, his relatives assemble round him and ask: "Dost thou know me? Dost thou know me?" Then, as long as his speech is not merged in his mind, his mind in breath, breath in heat (fire), heat in the Highest Being (Devata), he knows them.

2. 'But when his speech is merged in his mind, his mind in breath, breath in heat (fire), heat in the Highest Being, then he knows them not.

'That which is the subtle essence, in it all that exists has its Self. It is the True. It is the Self, and thou, O Svetaketu, art it.'

'Please, Sir, inform me still more,' said the son.

'Be it so, my child,' the father replied.

The next extract is from the Katha Upanishad of the Yajur-veda, and has by many scholars been classed as of later date.

FIRST VALLI

1. Vajasravasa, desirous (of heavenly rewards), surrendered (at a sacrifice) all that he possessed. He had a son of the name of Nachiketas.

4. He (knowing that his father had promised to give up at a sacrifice all that he possessed, and therefore his son also) said to his father: 'Dear father, to whom wilt thou give me?'

He said it a second and a third time. Then the father replied (angrily):

'I shall give thee unto Death.'

(The father, having once said so, though in haste, had to be true to his word and to sacrifice his son.)

5. The son said: 'I go as the first, at the head of many (who have still to die); I go in the midst of many (who are now dying). What will be the work of Yama (the ruler of the departed) which to-day he has to do unto me?'

6. 'Look back how it was with those who came before, look forward how it will be with those who come here-

after. A mortal ripens like corn, like corn he springs up again.'

(Nachiketas then enters into the abode of Yama Vaivasvata, and there is no one to receive him. Thereupon one of the attendants of Yama is supposed to say :)

7. 'Fire enters into the houses, when a Brahmana enters as a guest. That fire is quenched by this peace-offering;—bring water, O Vaivasvata!

8. 'A Brahmana that dwells in the house of a foolish man without receiving food to eat, destroys his hopes and expectations, his possessions, his righteousness, his sacred and his good deeds, and all his sons and cattle.'

(Yama, returning to his house after an absence of three nights, during which time Nachiketas had received no hospitality from him, says :)

9. 'O Brahmana, as thou, a venerable guest, hast dwelt in my house three nights without eating, therefore choose now three boons. Hail to thee ! and welfare to me !'

10. Nachiketas said: 'O Death, as the first of the three boons I choose that Gautama, my father, be pacified, kind, and free from anger towards me ; and that he may know me and greet me, when I shall have been dismissed by thee.'

11. Yama said : 'With my leave, Auddalaki Aruni, thy father, will know thee, and be again towards thee as he was before. He shall sleep peacefully through the night, and free from anger, after having seen thee freed from the jaws of death.'

12. Nachiketas said: 'In the heaven-world there is no fear ; thou art not there, O Death, and no one is afraid on account of old age. Leaving behind both hunger and thirst, and out of the reach of sorrow, all rejoice in the world of heaven.'

13. 'Thou knowest, O Death, the fire-sacrifice which leads us to heaven ; tell it to me, for I am full of faith. Those who live in the heaven-world reach immortality,—this I ask as my second boon.'

14. Yama said : 'I will tell it thee, learn it from me, and when thou understandest that fire-sacrifice which leads to heaven, know, O Nachiketas, that it is the attainment of the eternal worlds, and their firm support, hidden in darkness.'

15. Yama then told him that fire-sacrifice, in the beginning of the worlds, and what bricks are required for the altar, and how many, and how they are to be placed. And Nachiketas repeated all as it had been told to him. Then Mrityu, being pleased with him, said again :

19. 'This, O Nachiketas, is thy fire which leads to heaven, and which thou hast chosen as thy second boon. That fire all men will proclaim as thine. Choose now, O Nachiketas, thy third boon.'

20. Nachiketas said: 'There is that doubt, when a man is dead,—some saying, he is; others, he is not. This I should like to know, taught by thee; this is the third of my boons.'

21. Death said: 'On this point even the gods have been in doubt formerly; it is not easy to understand. That subject is subtle. Choose another boon, O Nachiketas, do not press me, and let me off that boon.'

22. Nachiketas said: 'On this point even the gods have been in doubt indeed, and thou, Death, hast declared it to be not easy to understand, and another teacher like thee is not to be found: surely no other boon is like unto this.'

23. Death said: 'Choose sons and grandsons who shall live a hundred years, herds of cattle, elephants, gold, and horses. Choose the wide abode of the earth, and live thyself as many harvests as thou desirest.'

24. 'If thou canst think of any boon equal to that, choose wealth, and long life. Be (king), Nachiketas, on the wide earth. I make thee the enjoyer of all desires.'

25. 'Whatever desires are difficult to attain among mortals, ask for them according to thy wish;—these fair maidens with their chariots and musical instruments,—such are indeed not to be obtained by men,—be waited on by them whom I give to thee, but do not ask me about dying.'

26. Nachiketas said: 'Thoughts of to-morrow, O Death, wear out the present vigour of all the senses of man. Even the whole of life is short. Keep thou thy horses, keep dance and song for thyself.'

27. 'No man can be made happy through wealth. Shall we have wealth, when we see thee? Let us live, as long as thou rulest? Only that boon (which I have chosen) is to be chosen by me.'

28. 'What mortal, slowly decaying here below, and knowing, after having approached them, the freedom from decay enjoyed by the immortals, would delight in a long life, after he has pondered on the pleasures which arise from beauty and love?'

29. 'No, that on which there is this doubt, O Death, tell us what there is in that great Hereafter. Nachiketas does not choose another boon but that which enters into what is hidden.'

SECOND VALLI.

1. Death said: 'The good is one thing, the pleasant another; these two, having different objects, chain a man. It is well with him who clings to the good; he who chooses the pleasant, misses his end.'

2. 'The good and the pleasant approach man: the wise goes round about them and distinguishes them. Yea, the wise prefers the good to the pleasant, but the fool chooses the pleasant through greed and avarice.'

3. 'Thou, O Nachiketas, after pondering all pleasures that are or seem delightful, hast dismissed them all. Thou hast not gone into the road that leadeth to wealth, in which many men perish.'

4. 'Wide apart and leading to different points are these two, ignorance, and what is known as wisdom. I believe Nachiketas to be one who desires knowledge, for even many pleasures did not tear thee away.'

5. 'Fools dwelling in darkness, wise in their own conceit, and puffed up with vain knowledge, go round and round, staggering to and fro, like blind men led by the blind.'

6. 'The Hereafter never rises before the eyes of the careless child, deluded by the delusion of wealth. "This is the world," he thinks, "there is no other;"—thus he falls again and again under my sway.'

7. 'He (the Self) of whom many are not even able to hear, whom many, even when they hear of him, do not comprehend; wonderful is a man, when found, who is able to teach this (the Self); wonderful is he who comprehends this, when taught by an able teacher.'

9. 'That doctrine is not to be obtained by argument, but

when it is declared by another, then, O dearest, it is easy to understand. Thou hast obtained it now; thou art truly a man of true resolve. May we have always an inquirer like thee!

10. Nachiketas said: 'I know that what is called treasure is transient, for the eternal is not obtained by things which are not eternal. Hence the Nachiketa fire-sacrifice has been laid by me first; then, by means of transient things, I have obtained what is not transient (the teaching of Yama).'

11. Yama said: 'Though thou hadst seen the fulfilment of all desires, the foundation of the world, the endless rewards of good deeds, the shore where there is no fear, that which is magnified by praise, the wide abode, the rest, yet being wise thou hast with firm resolve dismissed it all.'

12. 'The wise who, by means of meditation on his Self, recognises the Ancient, who is difficult to be seen, who has entered into darkness, who is hidden in the cave, who dwells in the abyss, as God, he indeed leaves joy and sorrow far behind.'

13. 'A mortal who has heard this and embraced it, who has removed from it all qualities, and has thus reached that subtle Being, rejoices, because he has obtained what is a cause for rejoicing. The house (of Brahman) is open, I believe, O Nachiketas.'

18. 'The knowing Self is not born, it dies not; it sprang from nothing, nothing sprang from it. The Ancient is unborn, eternal, everlasting; he is not killed though the body is killed.'

19. 'If the killer thinks that he kills, if the killed thinks that he is killed, they do not understand; for this one does not kill, nor is that one killed.'

20. 'The Self, smaller than small, greater than great, is hidden in the heart of the creature. A man who is free from desires and free from grief, sees the majesty of the Self by the grace of the Creator (or through the serenity of the elements).'

21. 'Though sitting still, he walks far; though lying down, he goes everywhere. Who, save myself, is able to know that God, who rejoices and rejoices not?'

22. 'The wise who knows the Self as bodiless within the

bodies, as unchanging among changing things, as great and omnipresent, he never grieves.'

23. 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda, nor by understanding, nor by much learning. He whom the Self chooses, by him the Self can be gained. The Self chooses him (his body) as his own.'

24. 'But he who has not first turned away from his wickedness, who is not tranquil, and subdued, or whose mind is not at rest, he can never obtain the Self (even) by knowledge.'

THIRD VALLI.

1. 'There are the two, drinking their reward in the world of their own works, entered into the cave (of the heart), dwelling on the highest summit (the ether in the heart). Those who know Brahman call them shade and light; likewise, those householders who perform the Trinachiketa sacrifice.'

2. 'May we be able to master that Nachiketa rite which is a bridge for sacrificers; which is the highest, imperishable Brahman for those who wish to cross over to the fearless shore.'

3. 'Know the Self to be sitting in the chariot, the body to be the chariot, the intellect (buddhi) the charioteer, and the mind the reins.'

4. 'The senses they call the horses, the objects of the senses their roads. When he (the Highest Self) is in union with the body, the senses, and the mind, then wise people call him the Enjoyer.'

5. 'He who has no understanding and whose mind (the reins) is never firmly held, his senses (horses) are unmanageable, like vicious horses of a charioteer.'

6. 'But he who has understanding and whose mind is always firmly held, his senses are under control, like good horses of a charioteer.'

7. 'He who has no understanding, who is unmindful and always impure, never reaches that place, but enters into the round of births.'

8. 'But he who has understanding, who is mindful and always pure, reaches indeed that place, from whence he is not born again.'

9. 'But he who has understanding for his charioteer, and who holds the reins of the mind, he reaches the end of his journey, and that is the highest place (step) of Vishnu.'

10. 'Beyond the senses there are the objects, beyond the objects there is the mind, beyond the mind there is the intellect, the Great Self is beyond the intellect.'

11. 'Beyond the Great there is the Undeveloped, beyond the Undeveloped there is the Person (Purusha). Beyond the Person there is nothing—this is the goal, the furthest road.'

12. 'That Self is hidden in all beings and does not shine forth, but it is seen by subtle seers through their sharp and subtle intellect.'

13. 'A wise man should keep down speech and mind; he should keep them within the Self which is knowledge; he should keep knowledge within the Self which is the Great; and he should keep that (the Great) within the Self which is the Quiet.'

14. 'Rise, awake! having obtained your boons, understand them! The sharp edge of a razor is difficult to pass over; difficult is the path (to the Self); the wise tell it.'

15. 'He who has perceived that which is without sound, without touch, without form, without decay, without taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond the Great, and unchangeable, is freed from the jaws of death.'

Translation of the Upanishads.

May I be allowed to say here a few words with regard to my translation. Those who know my translation of the Upanishads, published in 1879 and 1884, will easily see that I have altered it in several places. But I do not wish it to be understood that I consider my translation even now as quite free from doubt. Our best scholars know how far we are still from a perfect understanding of the Upanishads. When therefore, in 1879, I undertook a translation of all the more important Upanishads, all I could hope for was to give a better translation than what we had before. Though I was well aware of the difficulties of such an undertaking, I knew that I could count on the same indulgence which is always granted to a first attempt at

translating, nay, often, as in our case, at guessing and deciphering an ancient text. Nor have I been at all convinced that I was wrong in following a text, such as it is presupposed by the commentaries of Samkara, instead of introducing conjectural emendations, however obvious they seem to be. Scholars should learn that the more obvious their emendations are, the more difficult it becomes to account for the introduction of such palpable corruptions into an ancient text, such as it was at the time of Samkara. My determination also, whenever it was impossible to discover a satisfactory meaning, to be satisfied with Samkara's interpretations, who after all lived a thousand years ago, may be criticised, and I never represented it as more than a *pis aller*. Besides that, all the translators of the S. B. E. had to make a sacrifice in giving what they could give at the time, without waiting for the ninth year. Though I have hardly ever referred to the mistakes made by earlier translators of the Upanishads, but have simply corrected them, anybody who will take the trouble to compare them with my own will find a good harvest of them, as those who come after me will no doubt glean many a stray ear even in a field which so many mowers have mowed. But the work of the children who glean some ears is very different from that of the mower who has to mow a whole field alone. Such a work as Colonel Jacob's Concordance of the Principal Upanishads and the Bhagavad-gita, published in 1891, has placed at the disposal of all Vedantic students what may almost be called a mowing machine in place of a sickle; and the careful and brilliant translation of the Sixty Upanishads published by Professor Deussen, in 1897, shows what an immense advance has been made with its help. I have adopted many emendations, in the extracts given above, from Professor Deussen's work, and when my translations differ from his, all I can say is that I always differ most reluctantly from one who has devoted so many years to Vedantic studies, and whose mind is so thoroughly imbued with Vedantic ideas. If we could always know at what time each Upanishad was finally settled and reduced to writing, whether before or after the time when the Vedanta and Samkhya-philosophy assumed each its own independent and systematic form, our task

would be much lightened. Whenever we come across such words as Atman and Brahman we suspect Vedantic influences, whereas Purusha and Prakriti at once remind us of Samkhya doctrines. But Atman is by no means unknown to early Samkhya philosophers, nor is Purusha entirely outside the Vedantic horizon. To say, therefore, that Purusha must always be taken in the technical Samkhya sense, and Atman in that of the Vedanta, is going too far, at least at present. We go still further out of our depth if we maintain, with regard to the Katha Upanishad, for instance, that there was a time when it consisted of one chapter and three Vallis only. It may have been so, and who shall prove that it was not so? But on the other hand, what do we know of the compilers of the Upanishads to enable us to speak so positively on such a subject? Everybody can see that there was a division at III, 13, or 16, or 17. The technical repetition of certain words in IV, 17 might indicate that the Upanishad originally ended there, and that V, 18 is later. Anybody can see also that the second Adhyaya differs in spirit from the first. The name of Nachiketas, for instance, is never mentioned in the second chapter, except in the last and probably spurious or additional verse, and then it appears as Nachiketa, as derived from Nachiketa, not from the old form Nachiketas. We may easily discover a different spirit in the third, as compared with the first and second Valli. In fact, there is still plenty of work left for those who come after us, for with all that has been achieved we are on the threshold only of a truly historical study of Indian philosophy and literature. Here, also, we are still like children playing on the sea-shore and finding now and then a pebble or a shell, whilst the great ocean of that ancient literature lies before us undiscovered and unexplored.

Character of the Upanishads

Such utterances as I have here quoted from the Upanishads will hardly seem worthy of the name of philosophy. It would have been almost impossible to describe them so as to give a clear idea of what the Upanishads really are. With us philosophy always means something systematic,

while what we find here are philosophic rhapsodies rather than consecutive treatises. But that is the very reason why the Upanishads are so interesting to the historical student. Nowhere, except in India, can we watch that period of chaotic thought, half poetical, half religious, which preceded, in India at least, the age of philosophy, properly so called. Possibly, if we knew more of the utterances of such men as Heraclitus or Epimenides in Greece, they might show some likeness to the outpourings of the authors of the Upanishads. What is quite clear, however, is that the systematic philosophy of India would be perfectly unintelligible without the previous chapter of the Upanishads. And however unsystematic these relics of the childhood of philosophy may seem, there is really more system in them than appears at first sight. They contain a number even of technical terms which show that the Upanishads did not spring up in one day, and that there must have been a good deal of philosophical controversy during the age that is recorded to us in the Upanishads. If Svetaketu is represented as attending the schools of famous teachers till he is twenty-four years of age, and is then only learning from his father the highest wisdom, we see that that highest wisdom had already been fully elaborated in the formula of 'Tat tvam asi,' 'Thou art that,' that is, thou, man, art not different from that divine nature which pervades the whole world, as salt pervades the sea. You cannot see it, you cannot handle it, but you can taste it and know that, though invisible, it is there. That divine essence, that which is alone true and real in this unreal or phenomenal world, is present likewise, though invisible, as the germ of life in the smallest seed, and without it there would be no seed, no fruit, no tree, as without God there would be no world. That this ancient wisdom should be so often mixed up with what seems to us childish and absurd, is as true as it is difficult to explain, but we must remember that a long continued oral tradition must naturally leave a wide door open to additions of every kind.

Whatever we may think of these Upanishads, it cannot be doubted that they represent the soil which contained the seeds of philosophy which sprang up and had their full growth in the great systems of philosophy of a later age.

Vedanta-Sutras

IF now we turn to these, and first of all, to the philosophy elaborated by Badarayana, we find no longer rhapsodies, but a carefully reasoned system, contained in 555 short paragraphs, the so-called Vedanta-Sutras. We read there in the first Sutra and as a kind of title, 'Now then a desire to know Brahman,' or as Deussen translates Jijnasa, 'Now then research of Brahman.' The two words Atha and Atah which, I believe, were originally no more than introductory, and which occur again and again at the beginning of Sanskrit works, always give rise to endless and most fanciful interpretations. If we must assign to them any special meaning, it seems to me best to take Atha in the sense of Now, and Atah in the sense of Then or Therefore, implying thereby that the student has fulfilled certain preliminary conditions, such as Upanayana, reception by a teacher, Vedadhyayana, learning by heart the text of the Veda, including the Upanishads, and that he is therefore likely to feel a desire to understand the Veda and to know Brahman. It may be true also, as some commentators maintain, that in real life the first step would have been to study the Purva-Mimamsa, or what is called Dharma, law, virtue, &c.; and that only after having gained a knowledge of Dharma, particularly of the sacrificial Dharma, would there arise a desire to know Brahman. In that case the Mimamsa might be looked upon as one body, the Purva-Mimamsa forming the first, the Uttara-Mimamsa the second part, and we should have to consider the practice of virtue and the performance of sacrificial acts as a necessary preliminary to a study of the Vedanta-philosophy, or, as it is generally expressed, we should have to consider works as essential for producing that purity and serenity of the mind without which a knowledge of Brahman is impossible. I confess I doubt whether all this was present to the mind of Badarayana. He may have used Jijnasa, wish to know, instead of Vichara, research or discussion, on purpose, because in the true sense Brahman cannot be defined or known. But although Brahman cannot be known like all other things, by being defined as So and So, it can be explained negatively as Not so and Not so, and can thus be cleared from many doubts which arise from the various

utterances about it in the Upanishads. When we read however, that food is Brahman¹, that Manas is Brahman², that Vijnana is Brahman³, that the sun is Brahman⁴, nay that Narayana is Brahman⁵, there is surely room enough for trying to determine what Brahman really is, or at least what he or it was to Badarayana and his predecessors.

The best answer, however, to all these questions is that given in the next Sutra, '*That from which the origin &c. (origin, subsistence, and dissolution) of this world proceed*.' The full sense of this Sutra, according to the commentator, is: 'That omniscient, omnipotent cause from which proceed the origin, subsistence and dissolution of the world, which world is differentiated by names and forms, contains many agents and enjoyers, and is the abode of fruits or effects, caused by former actions, these fruits having their definite places, times and causes, and the nature of whose arrangement cannot be conceived by the mind—that cause is Brahman.'

If it be asked, how this is known, the commentator insists very strongly that such knowledge is not to be gained by sense perception or by inference, but simply by the Veda (Upanishads), passages of which have been collected and properly arranged in the Sutras. If in some places he admits as a second source of knowledge Sakshatkara, or manifestation, that can only be meant for intuition, but, strictly speaking, such intuition also presupposes a previous working of the organs of sensuous perception, while the object of such Sakshatkara, i.e. Brahman, can at first be supplied by the Veda only. In support therefore of our Sutra which is intended to give a general idea of Brahman, a passage is quoted from the Taitt. Up. III, 1, where Varuna explains to his son that 'that from which these beings are born, that by which, when born, they live, that into which

¹ Chhand. Up. VII, 7, 9, 2; Brih. Ar. V, 12, 1.

² Chhand. Up. III, 18, 1; VIII, 3, 2; Brih. Ar. IV, 1, 6.

³ Chhand. Up. VII, 7, 2.

⁴ Chhand. Up. III, 19, 1; Brih. Up. II, 1, 2.

⁵ Mahanar. Up. XI, 4.

⁶ The words which actually occur in the Sutra are printed in italics, to give an idea of the enigmatical style of the Sutras, and their utter uselessness without a commentary.

at their death they re-enter, try to know that, that is Brahman.'

Appeals to the Veda

And here we should mark a curious feature of orthodox Indian philosophy. Though the Vedanta appeals to the Veda, it appeals to it, not as having itself grown out of it or as belonging to it, but rather as an independent witness, looking back to it for sanction and confirmation. The same applies, though in a less degree, to other systems also. They all speak as if they had for several generations elaborated their doctrines independently, and, after they had done so, they seem to come back to get the approval of the Veda, or to establish their conformity with the Veda, as the recognised highest authority. This shows that a certain time must have elapsed after the final redaction of the Upanishads and the return, as it were, of their offspring, the Sūtras, to their original home. How this came about, we cannot tell, because we have no historical documents, but that there had been something very important intervening between the old Upanishads and the first attempts at systematising Vedānta and Sāṃkhya doctrines in the form of Sūtras is very clear by the manner in which the Sūtras appeal to the Veda. This constant appeal to the Veda as the highest authority was justified by the most elaborate arguments, as part of the question—How do we know?—a question which forms an essential preliminary to all philosophy in India.

Pramanas

We saw how the Charvakas admitted but one source of knowledge, the evidence of the senses, excluding all others. How they defended that sensuous knowledge against the uncertainties inherent in it, we do not know, because we do not possess those Sūtras. But it is characteristic of the Vedānta-Sūtras, that they pay much smaller attention to the Pramāṇas, the sources and authorities of knowledge, than the other systems. These questions of Pramāṇa are often referred to in the commentaries, but not so much in the text. Pramāṇa is originally the instrument of measuring, from Ma, to measure, and Pra, forth. It may be

translated by measure, standard, authority, and survives in the modern Persian Ferman, an authoritative order.

Pramanas according to the Samkhya

The Pramana which serves as a means (Sadhana) of determining, produces Pramiti, accurate knowledge, just as a Sadhana (means) produces Siddhi, truth or certainty. When we come to the Samkhya, we shall find there a very full and perhaps the oldest description of the three essential Pramanas, viz. Pratyaksha, Anumana, and Sabda. The first Pramana, Pratyaksha, is what we mean by sensuous perception, though it is also used in the sense of what can be perceived by the senses, the Drishta, i.e. what is seen. It is explained (Samkhya-Sutra I, 89) as cognition which arises from contact (with objects) and represents their form.

Pratyaksha

It is generally explained by Indriyarthā-samnikarsha, contact of the senses and their respective objects, and is said to involve really three stages, contact of the sense-organ with its object, and at the same time union of the sense with Manas, mind, and union of Manas, mind, with Atman, Self. There is a distinction made between two kinds of Pratyaksha, called Savikalpa and Nirvikalpa, with doubt and without doubt. The former seems to consist in our seeing an object, and then declaring that it is this or that; the latter in simply accepting a thing such as it is, without any previous idea of it, such as when we awake from sleep, see a tiger, and at once run away. Each sense working by itself, and on its own objects only, is the Asadharanakarana, the special or exclusive instrument of the knowledge conveyed by it. Sound, for instance, is heard by the ear only, and is conveyed by Akasa or ether. But not every sound is brought into immediate contact with the ear; it is transmitted through the ether, as we are told, by means of waves (Vichita), so that we may perceive the beating of a distant drum, one wave propelling the other across the vast ocean of ether, till it strikes the shore, i.e. the ear.

Anumana

The next Pramana is Anumana or inference, which is explained (l. c., I, 100) as knowledge of the connected on the part of one who knows the connection, or as knowledge of something that is not perceptible, but is known as being invariably connected (Vyapya) with something else that is perceived, as when we perceive fire (Vyapaka) from perceiving smoke (Vyapta). This is a very imperfect description of Anumana, which will be more fully explained hereafter, but it suffices for our present purpose. As an illustration, we have the common illustration that we know the presence of fire when we see smoke, and that we know the absence of smoke when we see no fire, always supposing that fire has been proved to be the Vyapaka or the *sine qua non* of smoke.

Sabda

Sabda (I, 101) or word, another Pramana, is explained to be instruction given by one that can be trusted (Aptopadesa); this one that can be trusted being for the Vedantists the Veda, but for the Samkhya and other systems, any other person also endowed with authority and therefore considered as trustworthy. It might easily be shown that these three Pramanas all go back to one, the Pratyaksha, because the invariable concomitance between smoke and fire and the like, on which the Anumana rests, can have been established by sensuous experience only; and the trustworthiness of any knowledge conveyed by word must equally depend on experience, or on acquaintance with the person who is or is not to be trusted.

The question is, whether this Sabda, word, was originally taken to signify the Veda such as we possess it¹. I have elsewhere given my reasons for believing that Sabda had really a far more general and more philosophical meaning, and that it may have been intended at first for Brahman, the Word, or for verbal knowledge as is conveyed by a word. The Hindus knew quite well that words such as

¹ Samkhya-Philosophie, p. 154, Anm. 3. That the connection between sound and meaning, and therefore the authority of words by themselves, occupied the Samkhyas, we see from Sutra V, 37.

greatness, goodness, nay, also such as animal, plant, metal, nay, even dog or cow, convey knowledge that cannot be gained either by perception or by inference alone, but only by the word. The same applies to Aptavachana, another term for Sabda, word, used in the Samkhya-philosophy. Apta, which is explained by Yogya, can hardly be translated by *aptus*. It means what has been obtained or received, and Aptavakya or Aptavachana need originally have meant no more than our traditional language such as it is, though it was explained afterwards as meaning the word of a person worthy of confidence, or even of a book believed in by the world at large. However, we must be satisfied with what the Samkhya philosophers tell us; and there can be no doubt that the followers of the orthodox Samkhya understood Sabda in the sense of Veda; though, considering that they admitted a divine, not a human origin of the Veda, it is difficult to understand how they could afterwards take it in the general sense of the word of one that can be trusted. The important question for us to consider is what other systems of philosophy have made of these three Pramanas. The Sutras of all the other systems of philosophy are well acquainted with them, and they are even referred to by the commentators of the Vedanta also. It seems strange at first sight, considering that the question of the possibility of knowing, and of the instruments of knowledge, forms the foundation of every true system of philosophy, that the Brahma-Sutras, though not the later Vedanta works, should apparently have attached so little importance to what may be called their *Critique of Pure Reason*. This would seem indeed to lower the Vedanta-philosophy to the level of all Pre-Kantian philosophy, but a little reflection will show us that there was in the Vedanta a sufficient excuse for this neglect. What at first sight makes the case still worse is that while Pratyaksha, perception, and Anumana, inference, are ignored, the only evidence invoked by Badarayana is Sruti or revelation, which, as we saw, was often invoked by the modern orthodox Samkhyas under the name of Sabda or word. To most philosophers revelation would seem a very weak instrument of knowledge, and one that could never claim more than a subordinate place, even if treated as a subdivision of Anumana or

inference. But we must remember that it is the highest object of the Vedānta to prove that there is only one true reality, namely Brahman, and that the manifoldness of the visible world is but the result of that nescience which the Vedānta is meant to destroy. It will then become intelligible why an appeal to the evidence of the senses or to inference would have been out of place and almost self-contradictory in the Vedānta. The commentator admits this when he says, 'If we acquiesce in the doctrine of absolute unity (Brahman), the ordinary means of right knowledge, perception, &c., become invalid, because the absence of manifoldness deprives them of their objects.' Hence, a doctrine which undertakes to prove that the manifold world, presented to us by the senses, is unreal, could not well appeal at the same time to the evidence of the senses, nor to inference which is founded on it, in support of truth or right knowledge, though it may and does readily acknowledge their importance for all the ordinary transactions of life. Thus Sāṃkara continues: 'So long as a person has not reached the true knowledge of the unity of the Self, it does not enter his mind that the world of effects, with its instruments and objects of right knowledge and its results of actions, is untrue; and hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not go on undisturbed.'

How well Bādarāyaṇa must have been acquainted with the ordinary evidences of knowledge, both Pratyakṣa and Anumāna, is best shown by the new meaning which he assigns to them, applying (I, 3, 28) Pratyakṣa to Sruti (revelation) and Anumāna to Smṛiti (tradition), the Veda being to him self-evident, while other works, such as the Law-books of Manu, the Mahābhārata (Bhagavad-gīta), nay even the Sāṃkhya and Yoga systems (IV, 2, 21), being Smṛiti, are true in so far only as they are not in opposition to the Veda. But everything else, every kind of Tarka or speculation, is excluded when the fundamental truths of the Vedānta are at stake. Thus Sāṃkara, II, 1, 11, says: 'In matters to be known from Sruti mere reasoning is not to be relied on. As the thoughts of man are altogether unfettered, reasoning, which disregards the holy texts and

rests on individual opinion only, has no proper foundation. One sees how arguments which some clever men had expogitated with great pains, are shown by people still more ingenious to be fallacious, and how the arguments of the latter are refuted in their turn by other men; so that on account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation. Nor can we get over this difficulty by accepting as well founded the reasoning of some person of recognised eminence, whether Kapila or any one else, since we observe that even men of the most undoubted intellectual eminence, such as Kapila, Kanada, and other founders of philosophical schools, have contradicted each other.'

This rejection of reason and reasoning, though not unfamiliar to ourselves, seems certainly strange in a philosopher; and it is not unnatural that Samkara should have been taunted by his adversaries with using reason against reasoning. 'You cannot,' they say, 'maintain that no reasoning whatever is well-founded, for you yourself can found your assertion that reasoning has no foundation on reasoning only. Moreover, if all reasoning were unfounded, the whole course of practical human life would have to come to an end.' But even this does not frighten Samkara. As all reasoning is admittedly founded on perception and inference, he replies, 'that although with regard to some things reasoning is known to be well-founded, with regard to the matter in hand there will be no escape, i.e. reasoning cannot there escape from the charge of being ill-founded. The true nature of the cause of the world on which final emancipation depends cannot, on account of its excessive abstruseness, even be thought of without the help of the holy texts; for it cannot become the object of perception because it does not possess qualities such as form and the like, and, as it is devoid of characteristic signs or qualities, it cannot lend itself to inference and other means of right knowledge.'

Here we approach a very difficult question, and have possibly to admit a weak link in the strong chain armour of both Badarayana and Samkara. How is the supreme authority of the Veda to be established against those who doubt it? It may be enough for the orthodox to say that

the Veda is its own proof, that it is self-luminous like the sun: but how are objections to be silenced? The Vedanta philosophers have no superstitions on any other points, and are perfectly fearless in the treatment of all other problems; they can enter into the most subtle controversies, and yet they are satisfied with the mere assertion that the Veda wants no proof, that its authority requires no support from elsewhere (*pramanyam nirapeksham*), that it is direct evidence of truth, just as the light of the sun is its own evidence of light, and at the same time the direct means of our knowledge of form and colour (II, 1, 1).

Authority of the Vedas

But who says so? Who but a fallible mortal? It would be hardly enough if we were to say that the Veda was the oldest document which the Brahmans possessed, that it may even have been brought into India from another country, that its very language required to be interpreted by competent persons. All this might have helped to invest the Veda with some kind of mysterious character; but my impression has always been that this would be taking too low a view of the Indian intellect. Veda, I hold, was not merely the name of a text or of texts, but was originally conceived in a far deeper sense.

The Meaning of Veda

We often read that Veda is Brahman, and Brahman is Veda, and in such passages Brahman is now generally taken in the sense of the *Samhitas* and *Brahmanas* such as we possess them. But might it not, like *Aptavachana*, to which we referred before, have meant originally knowledge or wisdom or *Sophia*; and as such a *Sophia* was impossible without words, might we not here also have a faint recollection of Brahman as the Word, the first creation of divine thought. After all, Veda means originally knowledge, and not hymns and *Brahmanas*, and as such would come very near to Wisdom or *Sophia*. I do not venture to speak positively on such a subject, because there is so little of real evidence left to which we could appeal. I give it simply as an idea that has presented itself to my mind as a way out of many difficulties. To prevent all misunder-

standings I say at once that I do not entertain the idea that such thoughts were borrowed from Greece and Alexandria, or had been matured during the as yet undivided Aryan period. All I should venture to suggest is that the idea of the Word or the Logos being the first revelation, manifestation or creation of a Divine Power is by no means so strange, even in a very early period of thought, as it seems to us. People who have thought at all about what a word is, not a mere sign or a means of communication, but an act embodying for the first time a definite idea which came into existence by being uttered, and afterwards thrown forth and realised in our objective world, would naturally, whether in Greece or in India, recognise in every word an act of a Divine Thinker, just as in every species they have to recognise the will of a Divine Creator. Samkara goes so far as to declare that the Veda is the cause of the distinction of all the different classes and conditions (species) of gods, animals, and men (I, 1, 3, and Brih. Ar. Upan. II, 4, 10). Nay he speaks still more distinctly in I, 3, 28: 'We all know from observation,' he says, 'that any one, when setting about something which he wishes to accomplish, first remembers the word denoting the thing, and after that sets to work.' What should he do when there is as yet no word to remember, but the word, that is, the idea, has first to be created? We therefore conclude that, before the creation, the Vedic words became manifest in the mind of Prajapati the creator, and that after that he created the things corresponding to these words. The Sruti also, when it says 'uttering Bhur He created the earth, &c.,' shows that the worlds, such as the earth, &c., became manifest, i.e. were created, from the word Bhur, which had become manifest in the mind (of Prajapati). In that case the recognition by Indian thinkers of Brahman as the Word or the Divine Thought, or as Veda, would by no means be so surprising as it sounds to us at first. It might then be said quite truly that the Sabda, sound, or Brahman or Vach or *Brih=word, was eternal, absolute, self-luminous, self-evident, in fact all that the Veda is said to be. Two such words as Brahman and Atman would by themselves convey that eternal truth for which the Vedanta-philosophy is fighting, and in support of which there is but

one appeal, not to sensuous experience nor to inference, but to the Word itself, i.e. to Brahman, or the Veda. I know full well how entirely hypothetical, if not mystical, this may sound to many Sanskrit scholars, but I could not entirely suppress these thoughts, as they seem to me the only way in which we can free our Vedanta philosophers from the charge of childishness, for imagining that they could establish the highest truths which are within the reach of the human mind, on such authorities as the hymns, the Brahmanas and even some of the Upanishads, as we possess them now.

Returning to the Vedanta, however, such as we know it from the Sutras, we must be satisfied with the expressed view of Badarayana that the evidence for what the Vedanta teaches is neither perception nor inference, but the Word (Sabda) alone, such as we find it in our manuscripts, or rather in the oral tradition of the Veda.

Work-part and Knowledge-part of the Veda

Of course a distinction has to be made, and has been made by Badarayana between the Knowledge-part, the Jnana-kanda, chiefly the Upanishads, and the Karmakanda, the Work-part, the hymns and Brahmanas. Both are called Veda or Sruti, revelation, and yet the work-part does not exist for the true philosopher, except in order to be discarded as soon as he has understood the knowledge-part. Sankara is bold enough to declare that the whole Veda is useless to a man who has obtained knowledge, or Mukti, or freedom. 'Not all the Vedas together,' he says, 'are more useful to one who has obtained true knowledge than is a small tank of water in a country flooded with water.' A man who has neglected the Vedas and disregarded the rules of the four Asramas, in fact, a man who has lost caste, may still be allowed to study the Vedanta as the fountain of all true knowledge, and thus become liberated (III, 4, 36). The hymns and Brahmanas refer in fact to the phenomenal world, they presuppose the existence of a manifold creation, of an enjoyer of what is to be enjoyed, of good works and their fruit. But all this, as we shall see, is not real, but phenomenal; it belongs to the realm of Avidya, Nescience, and vanishes as soon as true wisdom

or Vidya has been obtained. It is to be observed in the world, such as it is, as a lower stage, but as essential in leading on to a higher stage.

Vidya and Avidya

If then the highest truth contained in the Veda is the Tat Tvam Asi, that is, Thou, the Jivatman, art it (the Paramatman or Brahman), and if, as we are told, there is but one Brahman and nothing beside it, the Vedanta philosopher is at once met by the question, How then are we to account for the manifold Thou's, the many individuals, and the immense variety of the objective world? If the Veda is true, our view of the world cannot be true at the same time. It can therefore be due only to what is called Avidya, Nescience, and it is the very object of the Vedanta-philosophy to expel and annihilate this Avidya, and replace it by Vidya.

Subject and Object

This Avidya is the next point that has to be discussed. Samkara, in the introduction to his commentary, has some important remarks on it¹. 'As it is well known,' he says, 'that object and subject, which fall under the concepts of We and You (or as we should say, of the Ego and Non-Ego), are in their very essence opposed to each other, like darkness and light, and that the one can never therefore take the place of the other, it follows further that their attributes also can never be interchanged.' This means that object and subject mutually exclude each other, so that what is conceived as object can never in the same act of thought be conceived as subject, and *vice versa*. We can, for instance, never say or think: We are you, or You are we, nor ought we ever to substitute subjective for objective qualities. 'Therefore,' he continues, 'we may conclude that to transfer what is objective, that is what is perceived as You or Non-ego with its qualities, to what is subjective, that is what perceives as We, the Ego, which consists of thought, or *vice versa* to transfer what is subjective to what

¹ Three Lectures on the Vedanta, p. 62.

is objective, must be altogether wrong.' A subject can never be anything but a subject, the object always remains the object. 'Nevertheless,' he adds, 'it is a habit in human nature (a necessity of thought, as we might call it), to say, combining what is true and what is false, "I am this," "this is mine," &c. This is a habit, caused by a false apprehension of subject and predicate, and by not distinguishing one from the other, but transferring the essence and the qualities of the one upon the other.'

It is clear that Samkara here uses subject and object not only in their simple logical sense, but that by subject he means what is real and true, in fact the Self, while object means with him what is unreal and phenomenal, such as the body with its organs, and the whole visible world. In 'I am,' the verb has a totally different character from what it has in 'thou art' or 'he is.' Such statements therefore as 'I am strong,' or 'I am blind,' arise from a false apprehension which, though it is inseparable from human thought, such as it is, has slowly to be overcome and at last to be destroyed by the Vedanta-philosophy.

This distinction between subject and object in the sense of what is real and what is phenomenal is very important, and stamps the whole of the Vedanta-philosophy with its own peculiar character.

It follows in fact from this fundamental distinction that we should never predicate what is phenomenal or objective of what is real and subjective, or what is real and subjective of what is phenomenal and objective; and it is in causing this mistake that the chief power of Avidya or Nescience consists. I should even go so far as to say that this warning might be taken to heart by our own philosophers also, for many of our own fallacies arise from the same Avidya, and are due in the end to the attribution of phenomenal and objective qualities to the subjective realities which we should recognise in the Divine only, and as underlying the Human Self and the phenomenal world.

It must not be supposed, however, that the Avidya or Nescience which makes the world what we make it and take it to be, is simply our own individual ignorance, our being unacquainted with the truths of the Vedanta. It should rather be looked upon as inborn in human nature, or, from

an Indian point of view, as the result of accumulated thoughts and deeds before the mountains were brought forth. It has truly been called a general cosmical Nescience, inevitable for a time, as darkness is with light. So far as in true reality we are Brahman, our Nescience might indeed be called the Nescience of Brahman, if for a time only; and if we remember that it can be annihilated, we can understand why it was said to be nought, for, according to a general principle of the Vedanta, nothing that is real can ever be annihilated, so that nothing that is liable to annihilation has a right to be called real.

The Phenomenal Reality of the World

But it is very curious to find that though Samkara looks upon the whole objective world as the result of Nescience, he nevertheless allows it to be real for all practical purposes (*Vyavaharartham*). Thus we read (II, 1, 14), 'The entire complex of phenomenal existence is considered as true so long as the knowledge of Brahman and the Self of all has not arisen, just as the phantoms of a dream are considered to be true until the sleeper wakes. . . . ' Hence, as long as true knowledge does not present itself, there is no reason why the ordinary course of secular and religious activity should not go on undisturbed, and more particularly, why all the commands of the Veda, even of the work-part, should not be obeyed.

But apart from this concession, the fundamental doctrine of Samkara remains always the same. There is Brahman and nothing else; and to this Brahman as the subject, nothing must be ascribed that is peculiar to the individual living soul (I, 3, 19). The individual soul is, no doubt, Brahman, for the simple reason that there is nothing but Brahman, but Brahman is not the individual soul, which in its present state is personal, that is conditioned, and phenomenal. All we may predicate of that Highest Brahman is that it is one, never changing, never in contact with anything, devoid of all form, eternally pure, intelligent and free. To ascribe anything phenomenal to that Brahman or Atman would be the same error as to ascribe blue colour to the colourless ether of the sky.

Creation or Causation.

If with these ideas, taken as granted, we approach the problem of what we call the creation or the making of the world, it is clear that creation in our sense cannot exist for the Vedantist. As long as creation is conceived as a making or fashioning of matter, it does not exist for Badarayana; only so far as it is a calling forth out of nothing does it approach the ideas of the Vedantist. Creation with Badarayana would be nothing but the result of Nescience, and yet Brahman is again and again represented as the cause of the world, and not only as the efficient, but as the material cause as well, so far as such foreign terms can be applied to the reasoning of the Vedanta. Here lies our great difficulty in rendering Hindu-philosophy intelligible. The terms used by them seem to be the same as those which we use ourselves, and yet they are not. It is easy to say that *Karana* is cause and *Karya* effect, that the created world is the effect, and that Brahman is the cause. But the Vedantists have elaborated their own theory of cause and effect. According to them cause and effect are really the same thing looked at from two points of view, and the effect is always supposed to be latent in the cause. Hence, if Brahman is everything, and nothing exists besides Brahman, the substance of the world can be nothing but Brahman. Divyadasa, a living Vedantist, seems therefore to draw a quite legitimate inference when he says¹ that the universe with all its sins and miseries must have existed latent in Brahman, just as steam existed latent in water before it was heated, though it does not become evident as vapour till fire is brought near to water.

Cause and Effect

This question of cause and effect and their mutual relation has occupied most of the philosophical systems of India; and when we remember what different views of cause and effect have been held by some of the most eminent philosophers of Europe, it is not surprising that the Hindus also should have arrived at very different results. The Vedantists stand up for *Karya-karanabheda*, the non-

¹ Lectures on the Vedanta, p. 24.

difference or substantial identity of cause and effect, and the Samkhya philosophers agree with them up to a certain point. In the Vedānta, II, 1, 14, we read in so many words, *Tadananyatvam*, that is, 'they, cause and effect, are not other, are not different from each other.' On this, as a general principle, rests their dogma of the substantial identity of Brahman and the phenomenal world. Nor does Sankara support this principle by passages from the Veda only, but he appeals likewise to observation. Thus he continues, II, 1, 15, 'Only when a cause exists is an effect observed to exist, not when it does not exist. The non-difference of the two (cause and effect) is perceived, for instance, in an aggregate of threads, when we do not perceive the thing which we call cloth in addition to the threads, but merely threads running lengthways, and crossways. In the threads again we perceive finer threads, and in these again still finer threads, and so on. On this ground we conclude that the very finest parts which we can perceive are ultimately identical with their causes, viz. red, white, and black, these again with air, the air with ether, and, at last, the ether with Brahman which is without a second and the ultimate cause of the whole world.' Or again, when we look at a tree and ask what it is, when we see through its leaves and fruits, its bark and wood, and ask again what it is, the answer comes that it would be nothing if it were not Brahman, that it lives through Brahman, that it exists through Brahman, that it would not be at all but for Brahman. This is the real Pantheism of the Vedānta: and strange as it may sound to us, it would not be difficult to match it whether from our own philosophers or our poets. Even so recent a poet as Tennyson is reported to have said, 'Perhaps this earth and all that is in it—storms, mountains, cataracts, the sun and the skies, are the Almighty: in fact, such is our petty nature, we cannot see Him, but we see His shadow, as it were, a distorted shadow.' Is not this pure Vedānta? only that the Vedantists hold that a cause, by its very nature, can never become the object of perception, while what Tennyson calls the distorted shadow would come very near to the Avidya of Sankara. The Veda has declared 'that what is posterior in time, i.e. the effect, has its being, pre-

vious to its actual beginning, in the nature of the cause.' And Samkara adds that, even in cases where the continued existence of the cause (in the effect) is not perceived, as, for instance, in the case of seeds of the fig-tree from which spring sprouts and new trees, the term birth, as applied to the sprout, means only that the causal substance, viz. the seed, becomes visible by becoming a sprout through the continued accretion of similar particles, while the term death means no more than that through the secession of these particles, the cause passes again beyond the sphere of visibility.

This problem of cause and effect in connection with the problem of Brahman and the world was no doubt beset with difficulties in the eyes of the Vedantists. If they turned to the Veda, particularly to the Upanishads, there were ever so many passages declaring that Brahman is one and unchangeable, while in other passages the same Brahman is called the Creator, and from him, and not, as the Samkhyas hold, from a second non-intelligent power, called Prakriti, the creation, sustentation, and reabsorption of the world are said to proceed. If it be asked how two such opinions can be reconciled, Samkara answers: 'Belonging to the Self, as it were, of the omniscient Lord, there are names and forms (Namarupa).' These correspond very closely to the Logoi of Greek philosophy, except that, instead of being the ideas of a Divine Mind, they are the figments of Nescience, not to be defined as either real (Brahman), or as different from it. They are the germs of the entire expanse of the phenomenal world, that is, of what in Sruti and Smriti is called illusion (Maya), power (Sakti), or nature (Prakriti). Different, however, from all this is the Omniscient Lord, and in support of this a number of Vedic passages may be quoted, such as 'He who is called Ether is the revealer of all forms and names; that wherein these forms and names are contained, that is Brahman' (Chhand. Up. VIII, 14, 1); 'Let me evolve names and forms' (Chhand. Up. VI, 3, 2); 'He, the wise one, having defined all forms and having made their names, sits speaking,' i.e. creating (Taift. Ar. III, 12, 7); 'He who makes the one seed manifold' (Svet. Up. VI, 12). The Lord as creator, as Lord or Isvara, depends upon the limit-

ing conditions of the Upadhis of name and form, and these, even in the Lord, are represented as products of Nescience, not like the Logoi, creations of a Divine Wisdom. The true Self, according to the Vedanta, is all the time free from all conditions, free from names and forms, and for the truly informed enlightened man the whole phenomenal world is really non-existent.

To steer between all these rocks is no easy matter. Brahman, though called the material cause (Upadana) of the world, is himself immaterial, nay the world, of which he is the cause, is considered as unreal, while at the same time cause and effect are held to be identical in substance.

While the Vedantist is threatened by all these breakers, the Samkhya philosopher is far less imperilled. He starts with a Prakriti, a power different from Brahman, generally, though very imperfectly, translated by Nature, as the material cause of the world. Prakriti exists, as far as man is concerned, only so far as it is taken notice of by man (Purusha); and he, the Purusha, on taking notice, may therefore be called the efficient cause of the world, Prakriti itself being its material cause. Otherwise Kapila takes much the same view of the relation between cause and effect as the Vedantist. The Karya-karanabheda, the identity of cause and effect, is valid as much for Samkhya as for Vedanta. According to both, no real effect would be possible without the continuance of its cause. Though different in appearance or phenomenally, both are the same substantially. An effect is not something newly produced or created, it is a new manifestation only, the cause being never destroyed, but rendered invisible only. This is so characteristic a dogma of the Samkhya that this philosophy is often spoken of as the Sat-karyavada, the doctrine that every effect pre-exists, and is the effect of something real, while the Asat-karyavada is peculiar to Nyaya and Vaisesika, and strongly supported by the Buddhists. Whether this doctrine of the identity of cause and effect was first proclaimed by Kapila or by Badarayana, it is almost impossible to settle. Professor Garbe¹, who claims it for Kapila, may be right in supposing that it would be a more

¹ Samkhya-Philosophie, p. 232.

natural theorem for a follower of the Samkhya than of the Vedanta, but this could never be used as an argument that the Samkhya-philosophy is older in its entirety than the Vedanta. Sankara himself certainly gives us the impression that with him the recognition of the identity of cause and effect came first, and afterwards its religious application, the identity of Brahman and the world. For he says (II, 1, 20), 'Thus the non-difference of the effect from the cause is to be conceived. And *therefore*, as the whole is an effect of Brahman, and non-different from it, the promise is fulfilled.' It is curious that Kapila seems, almost in so many words, to guard against what is known to us as Hume's view of causality. For in Sutra I, 4, 1, he says, 'If it were only priority, there would be no law or hold (Niyama) between cause and effect.'

The Sat-karyavada, which might be compared with Herbart's *Selbsterhaltung des Realen*, is often illustrated by the very popular simile of the rope which is mistaken for a snake, but which, even in its mistaken character, has the very real effect of frightening those who step on it. There is more in this often-quoted simile than at first sight appears. It is meant to show that as the rope is to the snake, so Brahman is to the world. There is no idea of claiming for the rope a real change into a snake, and in the same way no real change can be claimed for Brahman, when perceived as the world. Brahman presents itself as the world, and apart from Brahman the world would be simply nothing. If, therefore, Brahman is called the material cause of the world, this is not meant in the sense in which the clay is the material cause of a jar. Even the apparent and illusory existence of a material world requires a real substratum, which is Brahman, just as the appearance of the snake in the simile requires the real substratum of a rope. If we once see this clearly, we shall also see that Nescience may quite as well be called the material cause of the world as Brahman, the fact being that, strictly speaking, there is with the Vedantists no matter at all, in our sense of the word.

Dreaming and Waking

THERE is, however, in the Vedanta, as well as in many other

systems of philosophy, a certain ambiguity as to what is meant by material and real. One would have thought that philosophers, who look upon everything as the result of Avidya or Nescience, would have denied all reality in the highest sense to everything except Brahman. And so in a certain sense they do. But besides the concession to which we alluded before, that for practical purposes (Vyavaharartham) things may be treated as real, whatever we may think of them in our heart of hearts, a concession, by-the-by, which even Berkeley and Kant would readily have allowed, there is another important argument. It is clearly directed against Buddhist philosophers who, carrying the Vedanta principle to its extreme consequences, held that everything is empty and unreal, and that all we have and know are our perceptions only. This is called the Sunyavada (doctrine of emptiness or vanity) or Vidya-matra (knowledge only). Although some Vedantists have been credited with holding the same opinion, and have actually been called Cryptobuddhists in consequence, Samkara himself argues most strongly against this extreme idealism. He not only allows the reality of the objective world for practical purposes (Vyavaharartham), but he enters on a full argument against the nihilism of the Buddhists. These maintain that perception in dreams is of the same kind as all other perception, and that the admission of the existence of external things is therefore unnecessary. No, says Samkara, there is a difference between perceiving viands and perceiving the satisfaction arising from eating them. He holds, therefore, that in perceiving anything we not only perceive our perceptions, but perceive something not ourselves, and not our perceptions. He also points out that there is this difference between dreaming and waking, that dreams on awaking are found to be unreal. Dreams at night are contradicted by full daylight, but perceptions in full daylight are not contradicted by dreams. When the Buddhist replies that, in spite of that, we never can be said to perceive anything but perceptions, the Vedantist answers that, though we perceive perceptions only, these perceptions are always perceived as perceptions of something. And if the Buddhists answer that these perceptions are illusive only,

that they are perceptions of things as if they were without us, the Vedantist asks What is meant by that 'without us,' to which all things perceived by us are referred? If our perceptions conform to anything without us, the existence of such perceived objects is *ipso facto* admitted. No one would say that perception and what is perceived are identical; they stand to each other in the relation of instrument and effect, just as when we speak of an impression, we admit something that impresses as well as something that is impressed.

This must suffice to show what the Vedantists thought of the difference between the real and the phenomenal, and what was the meaning they attached to Avidya by which not only the individual Egos, but the whole phenomenal world exists or seems to exist. Creation is not real in the highest sense in which Brahman is real, but it is real in so far as it is phenomenal, for nothing can be phenomenal except as the phenomenon of something that is real. No wonder that, with all these ambiguities about the phenomenally real and the really real, different schools even in India should have differed in their views about Avidya, and that European scholars also should have failed to form a clear idea of that creative Nescience of which we can neither say that it is or that it is not. Avidya, like all other words, has had a history. In the Upanishads it is often used in the simple sense of ignorance, and opposed to Vidya, knowledge. Both are in that sense simply subjective. Thus we read Chhand. Up. I, 1, 10: 'Both perform the sacrificial act, he who knows and he who does not know. But there is a difference between Vidya (knowledge) and Avidya (nescience). For what is performed with Vidya, with faith, and with the Upanishad, that is more efficacious.' Or again, Brih. Ar. Up. IV, 3, 20: 'If he feels in a dream as if he were murdered, then, in his ignorance, he takes that to be real whatever he fears, when awake.' Here we see that it is ignorance alone which imparts a false character of reality to the visions of a dream. In the same Upanishad, IV, 4, 3, a man, when dying, is said to shake off his body and his Avidya. We are right therefore, I believe, if historically we trace the concept of Avidya back to the subjective ignorance of the individual,

just as we saw that the higher concept of the Self, though in the end identical with Brahman, arose from that of the individual personal Self, when as yet not free from the limits of the Ego. In some of the later Upanishads this Nescience or Ignorance assumes a more independent character and even a new name, viz. Maya. It is then no longer the Nescience of the individual, but the result of that universal Nescience, which is the cause of what we should call the phenomenal world. Thus we read in the Svet. Up. IV, 10 : 'Know Prakriti (nature) as Maya (magic), and the great Lord as the Mayin (magician).' Though this is not pure Vedanta, it shows us, at all events, the way by which the ignorance of the individual became the cause of what we call objective reality, and led, at the same time, to the admission of an active and creative Lord, the personal Brahma or Isvara; how Avidya in fact become a Sakti or *potentia*, somehow or other related to Brahman itself.

But before there arises this Maya of objective nature, belonging as it were to Brahman himself, there was the Maya of the internal or subjective world. This was originally the only Maya, and, deceived by that Maya or Avidya, the Atman, or pure Self, was covered up (Upahita) or blinded, or conditioned by the so-called Upadhis, the conditions or impositions, if we may say so, in both senses. There is here again a certain ambiguity, the Upadhis being caused by primeval Avidya, and, from another point of view, Avidya being caused in the individual soul (Jivatman) by the Upadhis. These Upadhis are:

1. The Mukhyaprana, the vital spirit (unconscious);
2. the Manas, the central organ of perception, ready to receive what is conveyed to it by the separate senses, and to react on them by will; Manas being that which, as we say, perceives, feels, thinks and wills;
3. the Indriyas, the five senses, both afferent and efferent. The five afferent (Upalabधि) senses are the senses of hearing, touch, sight, taste, scent. The five efferent or acting senses (Adhyavasaya¹) are the senses of speaking, grasping, going, evacuating and generating;
4. the material organic body.

¹ Adhyavasayo buddhih, Samkhya Sutras II, 13.

To these is sometimes added—

5. The objective environment, or the objects or meanings of the senses (Artha).

All these are not the Atman, and it is only through Avidya that the Atman has become identified with them.

That there is in man something that can be called Atman or Self requires no proof, but if a proof were wanted it would be found in the fact that no one can say, 'I am not' (I being the disguised Atman), for he who would say so, would himself be not, or would not be. The question then is, What is really I or what is there real behind the I? It cannot be the body as influenced by our objective environment, for that body is perishable; it cannot be the Indriyas or the Manas or the Mukhyaprana, for all these have a beginning, a growth, and therefore an end. All these, called the Upadhis, conditions, are to be treated as Not-self; and if it be asked why they should ever have been treated as Self, the only possible answer is that it was through Nescience or Avidya, but through a Nescience that is not only casual or individual, but universal. What in our common language we call the Ego or Ahamkara is but a product of the Manas and quite as unsubstantial in reality as the Manas itself, the senses and the whole body.

We can understand how this startling idealism or monism—for it is not nihilism, though our philosophy has no better name for it—led to two distinct, yet closely united views of the world. All that we should call phenomenal, comprehending the phenomena of our inward as well as of our outward experience, was unreal; but, as the phenomenal was considered impossible without the noumenal, that is, without the real Brahman, it was in that sense real also, that is, it exists, and can only exist, with Brahman behind it. And this led to the admission by the strict Advaitists or Monists of two kinds of knowledge, well known under the names of Apra, the lower, and Para, the higher knowledge.

The Higher and the Lower Knowledge

THE higher knowledge consists in the distinction and thereby the freedom of the Self (Atman) from all its Upadhis, and this not for this life only, but for all eternity. This

is the true Moksha or freedom which implies knowledge of the identity of the Atman with Brahman, and deliverance from birth and rebirth in the constant evolution (Samsara) of the world. The lower knowledge is likewise founded on the Veda, but chiefly on its work-portion (Karmakanda), and teaches, not how Brahman is to be known, but how it or he is to be worshipped in its or his phenomenal state, that is, as a personal Lord and Creator, or even under the name of any individual deity. This worship (Upasana) being enjoined in many parts of the Veda, is recognised as obligatory on all who have not yet reached the highest knowledge. These are even allowed the comfort that, in worshipping a personal god, they are really worshipping Brahman, the true Godhead, though in its phenomenal aspect only, and they are promised, as a reward of their worship, happiness on earth and in heaven, nay by way of preparation, a slow advance (Kramamukti) towards complete Moksha or freedom.

In this sense it has been truly said that Samkara did not attack or destroy idolatry, though with him it was always symbolism rather than idolatry. On this point which has given rise to much controversy among the Hindus themselves, some appealing to Samkara's contempt of all ritualism and Karman, others to his defence of a worship of the popular gods, I may quote the words of a living Vedantist, Divyadas Datta, in his *Lecture on Vedantism*, p. 12. 'It is certain,' he says, 'that Samkara was opposed to the abuse of ritualism, and though he did not cut off all connection with idolatry, he tried to introduce the right spirit of idolatry. Idolatry in the sense of religious symbolism—and I believe the most orthodox Hindus would take no other view—cannot be open to objection. Symbolism there must be, whether in words or things. Verbal symbols appeal to the ear, and the symbols of things to the eye, and that is all the difference between them. Verbal symbolism is language. Who would object to the use of language in religion? But if the one is allowed, why should not also the other? To my mind, idolatry, apart from its attendant corruptions, is a religious algebra. And if verbal symbols, without the spirit or in a corrupted spirit, are not objectionable, [but are they not?] so, and to the same extent,

formal symbols, or stocks and stones also are unobjectionable. At one stage of its growth, idolatry is a necessity of our nature. The tender seed of a religious spirit requires to be carefully preserved in a soft coating of symbols, till it has acquired the strength to resist the nipping frost of worldliness and scepticism. When the religious spirit is mature, symbols are either given up, or suffered to remain from their harmlessness. Samkara did bow to idols, sometimes as symbols of the great Infinite, sometimes as symbols of lower orders of beings in whom he believed. These lower orders of divine beings, Brahma, Vishnu, Indra, Yama, &c., in whom he believed, are phenomenal, and subject to creation and dissolution as much as ourselves.' Samkara himself expresses this opinion very clearly when (I, 3, 28) he says : 'The gods (or deities) must be admitted to be corporeal, and though by their divine powers they can, at one and the same time, partake of oblations offered at numerous sacrifices, they are still, like ourselves, subject to birth and death.'

If Samkara did not claim full freedom or Moksha for himself, he did so, as he says, for the sake of others. 'If I,' he says, 'had not walked without remission in the path of works, others would not have followed by steps, O Lord!'

Is Virtue Essential to Moksha ?

ANOTHER question which has been hotly contested both in India and in Europe is whether Moksha can be the result of knowledge only, or whether it requires a fulfilment of moral duties also¹. Though, as far as I understand Samkara, knowledge alone can in the end lead to Moksha, virtue is certainly presupposed. It is the same question which meets us with regard to the Buddhist Nirvana. This also was in the beginning the result and the reward of moral virtue, of the restraint of passions and of perfect tranquillity of soul, such as we find it described, for instance, in the Dhammapada ; but it soon assumed a different character, as representing freedom from all bondage and

¹ See Moksha or the Vedantic Release, by Divyadas Dutta, Journal of the R. A. S., vol. xx, part 4.

illusion, amounting to a denial of all reality in the objective, and likewise in the subjective world. There are a few traces left in the Upanishads, showing that virtue was considered an essential preliminary of Moksha. In the Katha Upanishad II, I, which is generally quoted for that purpose, we read: 'The good is one thing, the pleasant another; these two having different objects chain a man. It is well with him, if he clings to the good; but he who chooses the pleasant, misses his end. The good and the pleasant approach a man; the wise goes round about them and distinguishes them. Yea, the wise prefers the good to the pleasant, but the fool chooses the pleasant through greed and avarice.' But even in this passage we are not told that virtue or self-denial by itself could secure Moksha or perfect freedom; nay, if we only read a few lines further, we see: 'Wide apart and leading to different points are those two, ignorance (Avidya) and what is known as wisdom (Vidya).' And Nachiketas is praised because he desires knowledge, and is not tempted away from it by pleasure. Still less convincing are passages taken from the Bhagavad-gita, a work which was meant to present different views of Moksha. All of them, no doubt, though they do not explicitly say so, presuppose high morality on the part of the candidate, so that Arjuna is made to say for himself:

Janami dharmam, na cha me pravrittih,
Janamy adharmam, na cha me nivrittih,

which has been somewhat freely translated: 'For what I would that I do not, but what I hate that do I.'

That later treatises, such as the Panchadasi, should lay great stress on the religious and moral side of Moksha is quite compatible with what has been maintained before, that Moksha cannot be achieved by sacrifices or by moral conduct, but in the end by knowledge only. Hence a prayer such as,—

'May such unchanging love as foolish people feel for earthly pleasures never cease in my heart when I call upon Thee!'

—may well be uttered by worshippers of Brahma or Isvara, but not by the true Mumukshu, who is yearning for Brahman and true Moksha.

Even the prayer from the Brihad-aranyaka (I, 3, 28)—
 'Lead me from the unreal to the real ! Lead me from darkness to light ! Lead me from death to immortality !'
 —refers to the lower knowledge only, and has for its reward another world, that is, the heaven world, which will also pass away.

It would not be difficult, no doubt, to produce passages which declare that a sinful man cannot obtain Moksha, but that is very different from saying that Moksha can be obtained by mere abstaining from sin. Good works, even merely ceremonial works, if performed from pure motives and without any hope of rewards, form an excellent preparation for reaching that highest knowledge which it is the final aim of the Vedanta to impart. And thus we read :
 'Brahmanas seek to know Him by the study of the Veda, by sacrifices, by charitable gifts' (Brih. Up. IV, 4, 22).

But when the knowledge of the highest Brahman has once been reached or is within reach, all works, whether good or bad, fall away. 'The fetter of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved, extinguished are all his works, when He has been beheld who is both high and low' (Mund. Up. II, 2, 8).

Hence, to imagine that true Moksha can be obtained by moral conduct alone is a mistake, while there are passages in the Upanishads to show that some Vedantists taught that a man who had reached Brahman and the highest knowledge, was even in this life above the distinction of good and evil, that is, could do nothing that he considered good and nothing that he considered evil. Dangerous as this principle seems to be, that whosoever knows Brahman cannot sin, it is hardly more dangerous, if properly understood, than the saying of St. John (Ep. I, v. 68), that whosoever is born of God, sinneth not.

The Two Brahmanas

It sometimes seems as if Samkara and Badarayana had actually admitted not only two kinds of knowledge, but two Brahmanas also, Sagunam and Nirgunam, with or without qualities, but this would again apply to a state of Nescience or Avidya only ; and it is in this sense alone that Brahman also may be said to be affected by Avidya.

nay to be produced by Avidya, not by the Avidya of single individuals, but by an Avidya inherent in sentient nature. The true Brahman, however, remains always Nirgunam or unqualified, whatever we may think about him ; and as, with regard to Brahman, to be conceived and to be is the same thing, so likewise, so far as we are concerned, Brahman is conceived by us and becomes to us qualified, active, creative and personal through the deception of the same universal and inevitable Avidya. In the same way the creation of the world and of man is not the work of Brahman, but the result of Avidya and of man while under her sway. This ambiguity runs through the whole of the Vedanta, at least according to the interpretation of Samkara.

It will be seen how small a step it was from this view to another which looked upon Brahman itself as affected by Avidya, nay which changed this Avidya into a Sakti or *potentia* of Brahman, thus lowering him, not raising him, to the character of an active creator. In full reality Brahman is as little affected by qualities as our true Self is by Upadhis (conditions), but the same Nescience which clouds us for a time, clouds *ipso facto* Brahman also, Atman (Jivatman) and Brahman being substantially one. If the qualified Brahman makes us, we, the qualified Atman, make Brahman, as our maker. Only we must never forget that all this is illusion, so that in truth we can predicate nothing of Brahman but Na, na, i.e. No, no ; he is not this, he is not that. He is, that is all we can say, and is more than everything else. In that sense Brahman may be called both Sat and Asat, being and not being, being in the highest sense, not being, as different from all that the world calls being or true. If in the later Upanishads Brahman is called Sach-chid-ananda, 'being, perceiving, and blessed,' then these three predicates are in reality but one, for he or it could not be without perceiving itself (*esse est percipere*), and he or it could not perceive himself or itself except as independent, perfect, unaffected and untrammelled by anything else (Advitiya). Having no qualities, this highest Brahman cannot of course be known by predicates. It is subjective, and not liable to any objective attributes. If it knows, it can only know itself, like the sun that is not lighted, but lights itself. Our knowledge of Brahman also

can only be consciousness of Brahman as our own subjective Atman or Self.

It seems only a concession to the prejudices, or let us say, the convictions of the people of India, that an ecstatic perception of Brahman was allowed as now and then possible in a state of trance, such as the Yogins practised in ancient, and even in modern times, though, strictly speaking, this perception also could only be a perception of the Atman as identical with Brahman. The fatal mistake which interpreters of the Vedanta-philosophy both in India and Europe have made is to represent this absorption or recovery (Samradhanam, accomplishment) as an *approach* of the individual soul towards God. There can be no such approach where there is identity, there can only be recovery or restitution, a return, a becoming of the soul of what it always has been, a revival of its true nature. Even Yoga, as we shall see, did not mean technically union, nor Yogin a man united with God, but Yoga is effort towards Nirodha or suppression of Chitta (the activity of thought) (see Yoga-Sutras I, 2).

We shall thus understand the distinction which the Vedantists and other Indian philosophers also make between the Brahman, *to ontos on*, and the Braman as Isvara, the personal God, worshipped under different names, as creator, preserver, and dissolver of the universe. This Isvara exists, just as everything else exists, as phenomenally only, not as absolutely real. Most important acts are ascribed to him, and whatever he may appear to be, he is always Brahman. When personified by the power of Avidya or Nescience, he rules the world, though it is a phenomenal world, and determines, though he does not cause, rewards and punishments. These are produced directly by the acts themselves. But it is He through whose grace deeds are followed by rewards, and man at last obtains true knowledge and Mukti, though this Mukti involves by necessity the disappearance of Isvara as a merely phenomenal god.

It must be clear to any one who has once mastered the framework of the true Vedanta-philosophy, as I have here tried to explain it, that there is really but little room in it for psychology or cosmology, nay even for ethics. The soul and the world both belong to the realm of things

which are not real, and have little if anything to do with the true Vedanta in its highest and truest form. This consists in the complete surrender of all we are and know. It rests chiefly on the tremendous synthesis of subject and object, the identification of cause and effect, of the I and the It. This constitutes the unique character of the Vedanta, unique as compared with every other philosophy of the world which has not been influenced by it, directly or indirectly. If we have once grasped that synthesis, we know the Vedanta. All its other teaching flows naturally from this one fundamental doctrine; and though its carefully thought out and worked out details are full of interest, they contain no thoughts, so entirely new at the time when they were uttered, as this identity of subject and object, or this complete absorption of the object by this subject.

Philosophy and Religion

It is interesting to see how this very bold philosophy of the Vedanta was always not only tolerated, but encouraged and patronised by religion and by its recognised representatives. Nor did the Vedanta as a philosophy interfere with popular religion; on the contrary, it accepted all that is taught about the gods in the hymns and in the Brahmanas, and recommended a number of sacrificial and ceremonial acts as resting on the authority of these hymns and Brahmanas. They were even considered as a necessary preliminary to higher knowledge. The creation of the world, though not the making of it, was accepted as an emanation from Brahman, to be followed in great periods by a taking back of it into Brahman. The individual souls also were supposed, at the end of each Kalpa, to be drawn back into Brahman, but, unless entirely liberated, to break forth again and again at the beginning of every new Kalpa.

Karman

THE individual souls, so far as they can claim any reality, date, we are told, from all eternity, and not from the day of their birth on earth. They are clothed in their Upadhis (conditions) according to the merit or demerit which they have acquired by their former, though long-forgotten, acts.

Here we perceive the principal moral element in the ancient Vedānta, so far as it is meant for practical life, and this doctrine of Karman or deed, to which we alluded before, has remained to the present day, and has leavened the whole of India, whether it was under the sway of Brahmans or of Buddhists. The whole world, such as it is, is the result of acts; the character and fate of each man are the result of his acts in this or in a former life, possibly also of the acts of others. This is with them the solution of what we venture to call the injustice of God. It is their *Theodicee*. A man who suffers and suffers, as we say, unjustly, seems to them but paying off a debt or laying up capital for another life. A man who enjoys health and wealth is made to feel that he is spending more than he has earned, and that he has therefore to make up his debt by new efforts. It cannot be by a Divine caprice that one man is born deaf or dumb or blind, another strong and healthy. It can be the result of former acts only, whether, in this life, the doer of them is aware of them or not. It is not even necessarily a punishment, it may be a reward in disguise. It might seem sometimes as if Avidyā too, which is answerable for the whole of this phenomenal world, had to be taken as the result of acts far back before the beginning of all things. But this is never clearly stated. On the contrary, this primeval Avidyā is left unexplained, it is not to be accounted for, as little as Brahman can be accounted for. Like Brahman it has to be accepted as existent; but it differs from Brahman in so far as it can be destroyed by Vidya, which is the eternal life-spring of Brahman. The merit which can be acquired by man even in this state of Avidyā is such that he may rise even to the status of a god, though for a time only, for at the end of a Kalpa even gods like Indra and the rest have to begin their career afresh. In fact it might be said with some truth that Avidyā is the cause of everything, except of Brahman; but that the cause of that primeval Avidyā is beyond our powers of conception.

Brahman is Everything

THESE powers of conception are real indeed for all practical purposes, but in the highest sense they too are phenomenal

only. They too are but Namarupa, name and form ; and the reality that lies behind them, the Atman that receives them, is Brahman and nothing else. This might become clearer if we took Brahman for the Kantian *Ding an sich*, remembering only that, according to the Kantian philosophy, the Rupa, the forms of intuition and the categories of thought, though subjective, are accepted as true, while the Vedanta treats them also as the result of Nescience, though true for all practical purposes in this phenomenal life. In this sense the Vedanta is more sceptical or critical than even Kant's critical philosophy, though the two agree with each other again when we remember that Kant also denies the validity of these forms of perception and thought when applied to transcendent subjects. According to Kant it is man who creates the world, as far as its form (Namarupa) is concerned ; according to the Vedanta this kind of creation is due to Avidya. And strange as it may sound to apply that name of Avidya to Kant's intuitions of sense and his categories of the understanding, there is a common element in them, though hidden under different names. It would be natural to suppose that this Atman within had been taken as a part of Brahman, or as a modification of Brahman : but no. According to Samkara the world is, as I tried to show¹ on a former occasion, the whole of Brahman in all its integrity, and not a part only ; only, owing to Avidya, wrongly conceived and individualised. Here we have in fact the Hellenmerian theory of Plotinus and of Dr. Henry More, anticipated in India. If the Atman within seems limited like the Brahman when seen in the objective world, this is once more due to Avidya. Brahman ought to be omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent ; though we know but too well that in ourselves it is very far from all this.

The Sthula-and Sukshma-sarira

THESE are the conditions or Upadhis which consist of Manas, mind, Indriyas, senses, Pranas, vital spirits, and the Sarira, body, as determined by the outward world. This Vedantic arrangement of our organic structure and our

¹ Theosophy, p. 280.

mental organisation is curious, but it seems to have been more or less the common property of all Indian philosophers, and supplied by the common language of the people. What is peculiar in it is the admission of a central organ, receiving and arranging what has been conveyed to it by the separate organs of sense. We have no word corresponding to it, though with proper limitations we may continue to translate it by *mens* or mind. It would represent perception as uniting and arranging the great mass of sensations, but it includes besides Upalabdhi, perception, Adhyavasaya, determination also, so far as it depends on a previous interaction of percepts. Hence a man is said to see by the mind (*Manas*, *nous*), but he may also be said to decide and act by the mind (*Manas*). All this may seem very crude, leaving particularly the question of the change of mere sensations into percepts (*Vorstellungen*), a subject so carefully elaborated by modern philosophers, and of percepts into concepts, unapproached and unexplained. Here the philosophy of Herbart would supply what is wanted. He too, being opposed to the admission of various mental faculties, is satisfied with one, the *Manas*, and tries to explain all psychical phenomena whatever as the result of the action and interaction of elementary *Vorstellungen* (ideas or presentations).

By the side of the vital spirit, the *Mukhya Prana*, we find a fivefold division into *Prana*, *Upana*, *Vyana*, *Samana*, and *Udana*, meaning originally forth-, off-, through-, with-, and out-breathing, but afterwards defined differently and without much reference to any physiological data. This also is a doctrine common to most systems of Indian philosophy, though it is difficult to see by what physiological observations it could have been suggested.

What is more interesting is the distinction between the *Sthula-* and *Sukshma-sarira*, the coarse and the fine body, the former the visible outward body; the latter invisible and consisting of *Mukhya Prana*, vital spirit, *Manas*, mind, and *Indriyas*, organs of sense. This body is supposed to remain after death, while the outer body is dissolved into its material elements. The thin or subtle body, though transparent or invisible, is nevertheless accepted as material; and it is this *Sukshma-sarira* which is supposed to migrate

after death from world to world, but, for the most part, in an unconscious state. It is not like a human body with arms and legs.

The Four States

HERE again we come across an original idea of Indian philosophy, the doctrine of the four states, the state of being awake, the state of dreaming, the state of deep and dreamless sleep, to which is added as the fourth, the state of death. In the first state the Atman is supposed to be perceiving and acting by means of the Manas and the Indriyas. In the second the Indriyas cease to act, but the Manas remains active, and the Atman, joined to the Manas, moves through the veins of the body and sees dreams made out of the remnants of former impressions (Vasanas). The third state arises from a complete separation of Atman from Manas and Indriyas. While these are absorbed in the vital spirit, which remains in full activity, the Atman in the heart is supposed to have for a time become one with Brahman, but to return unchanged at the time of awakening. In the fourth or disembodied state the Atman with the Sukshma-sarira is supposed to escape from the heart through a vein in the head or through the hundred veins of the body, and then to take, according to merit and knowledge, different paths into the next life.

Eschatology

Such fancies seem strange in systems of philosophy like the Vedanta; and, with the full recognition of the limits of human knowledge, we can hardly understand how Vedantists accepted this account of the Sukshma-sarira, the circumstances attending the departure of the soul, in fact, a complete Eschatology, simply on the authority of the Veda. It is taken over from the Upanishads, and that may be the excuse for it. Vedantists had once for all bound themselves to accept the Upanishads as revealed truth, and the usual result followed. But we should see clearly that, while much may be taken over from the Veda as due to Avidya, we are here really moving in an Avidya within that Avidya. For practical purposes Avidya may often be

called common sense, under its well-understood limitations, or the wisdom of the world. But these dreams about the details of a future life are a mere phantasmagoria. They cannot even be treated as Naisargika, or inevitable. They are simply Mithyajnana, fanciful or false knowledge, if not that which is commonly illustrated by the son of a barren woman—that is, a self-contradictory statement—that kind at least which is unsupported by any evidence, such as the horn of a hare. This is really a weakness that runs through the whole of the Vedanta, and cannot be helped. After the supreme and superhuman authority of the Word or of the Veda had once been recognised, a great portion of the sacred traditions of the Vedic age, incorporated as they are in the hymns, the Brahmanas, and the Upanishads, had to be accepted with the rest, though accepted as part of the *Apara Vidya*, the lower knowledge only. All the sacrificial rules, nay the very conception of a sacrifice, had no place in the *Para Vidya*, or the highest knowledge, because they involved an actor and an enjoyer of the fruits of such acts, and the truly enlightened man cannot be either an actor or an enjoyer¹. However, as a preparation, as a means of subduing the passions and purifying the mind by drawing it away from the low and vulgar interests of life, all such commandments, together with the promises of rewards vouchsafed to them, might perhaps have been tolerated. But when we come to a full description of the stations on the road by which the subtle body is supposed to travel from the veins of this body to the very steps of the golden throne of the Lower Brahman, we wonder at the long suffering of the true philosopher who has learnt that the true and highest knowledge of the Vedanta removes in the twinkling of an eye (*Apatatah*) the veil that in this life seems to separate *Atman* from Brahman. As these eschatological dreams have been included in the Vedanta system, they had to be mentioned here, though they are better studied in the pages of the Upanishads.

We are told there that, in the case of persons who have fulfilled their religious or sacrificial duties and have lived a good life, but have not yet reached the highest know-

¹ See Samkara's Introduction to the *Altareya Upanishad*.

ledge, the subtle body in which the Atman is clothed migrates, carried along by the Udana through the Murdhanya Nadi, the capital vein, following either the path of the fathers (Pitriyana) or the path of the gods (Devayana). The former is meant for good people, the latter for those who are good and have already reached the lower, if not the highest knowledge. The former leads on to smoke, night, the waning moon, the waning year, the world of the fathers, the ether, and lastly the moon. In the moon the departed souls remain for a time enjoying the rewards of their good deeds, in company with the Pitris, and then descend again, supported by the remnant of unrewarded merit due to their good works, to the ether, wind, smoke, cloud, rain, and plants. From the plants springs seed which, when matured in the womb, begins a new life on earth in such a station as the rest of his former deeds (Anusaya), *Anlage*, may warrant. As this is, as far as I know, the earliest allusion to metempsychosis or *Seelenwanderung*, it may be of interest to see in what sense Samkara in his commentary on Sutra III, 1, 22 took it¹:

"It has been explained," he says, "that the souls of those who perform sacrifices, &c., after having reached the moon, dwell there as long as their works last, and then redescend with a remainder of their good works. We now have to inquire into the mode of that descent. On this point the Veda makes the following statement: "They return again the way they came to the ether, from the ether to the air (wind). Then the sacrificer having become air becomes smoke, having become smoke he becomes mist, having become mist he becomes a cloud, having become a cloud he falls down as rain." Here a doubt arises whether the descending souls pass over into a state of identity (Sabhavyam) with ether, &c., or into a state of similarity (Samyam) only. The Purvapakshin (opponent) maintains that the state is one of identity, because this is directly stated by the text. Otherwise there would take place what is called indication only (Lakshana, i.e. secondary application of a word), and whenever the doubt lies be-

¹ S.B.E., vol. xxxvii, Thibaut's translation.

tween a directly expressed and a merely indicated meaning, the former is to be preferred. Thus the following words also, "Having become air he becomes smoke," &c., are appropriate only if the soul be understood to identify itself with them. Hence it follows that the souls (of the departed) become really identical with ether. To this we (Samkara) reply that they only pass into a state of similarity to ether, &c. When the body, consisting of water which the soul had assumed in the sphere of the moon for the purpose of enjoyment, dissolves at the time when that enjoyment comes to an end, then it becomes subtle like ether, passes thereupon into the power of the air, and then gets mixed with smoke, &c. This is the meaning of the clauses, "They return as they came to the ether, from the ether to the air," &c. How is this known to be the meaning? Because thus only is it possible. For it is not possible that one thing should become another in the literal sense of the word. If, moreover, the souls became identified with ether, they could no longer descend through the air. And as connection with the ether is, on account of its all-pervadingness, eternal, no other connection (of the souls) with it can here be meant, but their entering into a state of similarity to it. In cases where it is impossible to accept the literal meaning of the text, it is quite proper to assume the meaning which is merely indicated. For these reasons the souls' becoming ether, &c., has to be taken in the secondary sense of their passing into a state of similarity to ether, and so on.'

We see from this that Samkara believed in a similarity only, an outward and temporary similarity between the departed (in its Sukshma-sarira) and the ether, air, mist, cloud, and rain; and it is important to observe how, in doing so, he violently twisted the natural meaning of *Sabhavya*, the word used in the *Sutras*, rather than altering a word of the *Sutra*, and replacing *Sabhavyam* by *Samyam*.

A similar difficulty arises again when it has to be determined whether the departed, in his further descent, actually becomes a plant, such as rice, corn, sesamum, beans, &c., or becomes merely connected with them. Samkara decides strongly in favour of the latter view, though here again

the actual words of the Sutra have certainly to be twisted by him ; nay, though Samkara himself has to admit that other people may really, on account of their bad deeds, sink so low as to become plants. He only denies this with reference to the departed who, on account of their pious works, have already reached the moon, and are after that redescending upon earth.

Lastly, if it is said that the plant, when eaten, becomes a progenitor, this also, according to Samkara, can only mean that it is joined with a progenitor. For the progenitor must exist long before he eats the rice or the beans, and is able to beget a child. Anyhow, the child when begotten is the soul that had ascended to and descended from the moon, and is born again according to his former works.

I must confess that, though the Vedantists may be bound by Samkara's interpretation, it seems to me as if the author of the Sutras himself had taken a different view, and had looked throughout on ether, air, mist, cloud, rain, plants as the habitat, though the temporary habitat only, of the departed in their subtle body¹.

Little is said in the Upanishads of those who, owing to their evil deeds, do not even rise to the moon and descend again. But Badarayana tries to make it clear that the Upanishads know of a third class of beings (III, 1, 12) who reap the fruits of their evil actions in Samyamana (abode of Yama) and then ascend to earth again. Theirs is the third place alluded to in the Chhand. Upanishad V, 10, 8.

But while evil doers are thus punished in different hells, as mentioned in the Puranas, and while pious people are fully rewarded in the moon and then return again to the earth, those who have been pious and have also reached at least the lower knowledge of Brahman follow a different road. After leaving the body, they enter the flame, the day, the waxing moon, the waxing year (northern precession), the year, the world of the Devas, the world of Vayu, air, the sun, the moon, and then lightning ; but all these, we are told, are not abodes for the soul, but guides only who, when the departed has reached the lightning, hand him over to

¹ See Vishnu Dh. S. XLIII, 45.

a person who is said to be not-a-man. This person conducts him to the world of Varuna, then to that of Indra, and lastly to that of Prajapati or the qualified Brahma. Here the souls are supposed to remain till they realise true knowledge or the Samyagdarsana, which does not mean universal, but thorough and complete knowledge, that knowledge which, if obtained on earth, at once frees a man from all illusion. Finally the souls, when fully released, share in all the powers of Brahman except those of creating and ruling the universe. They are not supposed ever to return to the world of Samsara (IV, 4, 17).

All this is hardly to be called philosophy, neither do the different descriptions of the road on which the souls of the pious are supposed to wander towards Brahma, and which naturally vary according to different schools, help us much towards a real insight into the Vedanta. But it would have been unfair to leave out what, though childish, is a characteristic feature of the Vedanta-philosophy, and must be judged from a purely historical point of view.

Freedom in this Life

WHAT is of importance to remember in these ancient fancies is that the enlightened man may become free or obtain Mukti even in this life (Jivanmukti¹). This is indeed the real object of the Vedanta-philosophy, to overcome all Nescience, to become once more what the Atman always has been, namely Brahman, and then to wait till death removes the last Upadhis or fetters, which, though they fetter the mind no longer, remain like broken chains hanging heavy on the mortal body. The Atman, having recovered its Brahmahood, is even in this life so free from the body that it feels no longer any pain, and cannot do anything whether good or bad. This has been always laid hold of as the most dangerous doctrine of Vedantism, and no doubt it may be both misunderstood and misapplied. But in the beginning it meant no more than that the Atman, which is above the distinctions of subject and object, of past and present, of cause and effect, is also by necessity above the distinction of good and evil. This never was

¹ Vedanta-Sutras III, 3, 28.

intended as freedom in the sense of licence, but as freedom that can neither lapse into sinful acts nor claim any merit for good acts, being at rest and blessed in itself and in Brahman.

It is hardly necessary to say or to prove that the Vedanta-philosophy, even in its popular form, holds out no encouragement to vice. Far from it. No one can even approach it who has not previously passed through a course of discipline, whether as a student (*Brahmacharin*) or as a householder (*Grihastha*). In order to make this quite clear, it may be useful to add a few verses from one of the many popular works intended to teach Vedanta to the masses. It is called the *Mohamudgara*, the Hammer of Folly, and is ascribed to *Samkara*. Though not strictly philosophical, it may serve at least to show the state of mind in which the true Vedantist is meant to maintain himself. It was carefully edited with Bengali, Hindi and English translations by *Durga Das Ray*, and published at *Darjeeling* in 1888.

‘Fool ! give up thy thirst for wealth, banish all desires from thy heart. Let thy mind be satisfied with what is gained by thy *Karman*.

Who is thy wife and who is thy son ? Curious are the ways of this world. “Who art thou ? Whence didst thou come ? Ponder on this, O Brother.”

Do not be proud of wealth, of friends, or youth. Time takes all away in a moment. Leaving all this which is full of illusion, leave quickly and enter into the place of Brahman.

Life is tremulous like a water-drop on a lotus-leaf. The company of the good, though for a mement only, is the only boat for crossing this ocean of the world.

As is birth so is death, and so is the dwelling in the mother’s womb. Thus is manifest the misery of the world. How can there be satisfaction here for thee, O Man !

Day and night, morning and evening, winter and spring come and go. Time is playing, life is waning—yet the breath of hope never ceases.

The body is wrinkled, the hair grey, the mouth has become toothless, the stick in the hand shakes, yet man leaves not the anchor of hope.

To live under a tree of the house of the gods, to sleep on the earth, to put on a goat-skin, to abandon all worldly enjoyment ; when does such surrender not make happy ?

Do not trouble about enemy, friend, son, or relation, whether for war or peace. Preserve equanimity always if you desire soon to reach the place of Vishnu (Vishnu-pada)

The eight great mountains, the seven oceans, Brahma, Indra, the Sun and the Rudras, thou, I and the whole world are nothing ; why then is there any sorrow ?

In thee, in me, and in others there dwells Vishnu alone, it is useless to be angry with me and impatient. See every self in Self, and give up all thought of difference.

The child is given to play, the youth delights in a beautiful damsel, an old man is absorbed in cares—no one clings to the Highest Brahman.

Consider wealth as useless, there is truly no particle of happiness in it. The rich are afraid even of their son, this is the rule established everywhere.

So long as a man can earn money, his family is kind to him. But when his body becomes infirm through old age, no man in the house asks after him.

Having given up lust, anger, avarice, and distraction, meditate on thyself, who thou art. Fools without a knowledge of Self are hidden in hell and boiled.

In these sixteen verses the whole teaching of the disciples has been told. Those in whom this does not produce understanding, who can do more for them ?

Different Ways of Studying Philosophy

THIS may not be exactly moral teaching as we understand it. But there are two ways of studying philosophy. We may study it in a critical or in a historical spirit. The critic would no doubt fasten at once on the supersession of morality in the Vedanta as an unpardonable flaw. One of the corner-stones, without which the grandest pyramid of thought must necessarily collapse, would seem to be missing in it. The historian on the other hand will be satisfied with simply measuring the pyramid or trying to scale it step by step, as far as his thoughts will carry him. He would thus understand the labour it has required

in building up, and possibly discover some counteracting forces that render the absence even of a corner-stone intelligible, pardonable, and free from danger. It is surely astounding that such a system as the Vedanta should have been slowly elaborated by the indefatigable and intrepid thinkers of India thousands of years ago, a system that even now makes us feel giddy, as in mounting the last steps of the swaying spire of an ancient Gothic cathedral. None of our philosophers, not excepting Heraclitus, Plato, Kant, or Hegel, has ventured to erect such a spire, never frightened by storms or lightning. Stone follows on stone in regular succession after once the first step has been made, after once it has been clearly seen that in the beginning there can have been but One, as there will be but One in the end, whether we call it Atman or Brahman. We may prefer to look upon the expansion of the world in names and forms as the work of Sophia or as the realised Logos, but we cannot but admire the boldness with which the Hindu metaphysician, impressed with the miseries and evanescence of this world, could bring himself to declare even the Logos to be but the result of Avidya or Nescience, so that in the destruction of that Avidya could be recognised the highest object, and the *summum bonum* (Puru-shartha) of man. We need not praise or try to imitate a Colosseum, but if we have any heart for the builders of former days we cannot help feeling that it was a colossal and stupendous effort. And this is the feeling which I cannot resist in examining the ancient Vedanta. Other philosophers have denied the reality of the world as perceived by us, but no one has ventured to deny at the same time the reality of what we call the Ego, the senses and the mind, and their inherent forms. And yet after lifting the Self above body and soul, after uniting heaven and earth, God and man, Brahman and Atman, these Vedanta philosophers have destroyed nothing in the life of the phenomenal beings who have to act and to fulfil their duties in this phenomenal world. On the contrary, they have shown that there can be nothing phenomenal without something that is real, and that goodness and virtue, faith and works, are necessary as a preparation, nay as a *sine qua non*, for the attainment of that highest knowledge.

which brings the soul back to its source and to its home, and restores it to its true nature, to its true Selfhood in Brahman.

And let us think how keenly and deeply Indian thinkers must have felt the eternal riddles of this world before they could propose so desperate a solution as that of the Vedanta ; how desperate they must have thought the malady of mankind to be, before they could think of so radical a cure. A student of the history of philosophy must brace himself to follow those whom he wants to reach and to understand. He has to climb like a mountaineer, undismayed by avalanches and precipices. He must be able to breathe in the thinnest air, never discouraged even if snow and ice bar his access to the highest point ever reached by the boldest explorers. Even if he has sometimes to descend again, disappointed, he has at all events strengthened his lungs and his muscles for further work. He has done his athletic exercise, and he has seen views such as are never seen in the valleys below. I am myself not a mountaineer, nor am I altogether a Vedantist ; but if I can admire the bold climbers scaling Mount Gauri-Samkar, I can also admire the bold thinkers toiling up to heights of the Vedanta where they seem lost to us in clouds and sky. Do we imagine that these ascents were undertaken from mere recklessness, from mere love of danger ? It is easy for us to call those ancient explorers reckless adventurers, or dispose of them with the help of other names, such as mystic or pantheist, often but half understood by those who employ them. The Vedantists have often been called Atheists, but as the gods which they denied were only Devas, or what we call false gods, they might thus far have been forgiven. They have been called Pantheists, though their *theos*, or their *theoi*, were not the Pan, but the Pan was their *theos*. They have been called Nihilists, but they themselves have drawn a sharp line between the upholders of the Sunya-vada¹, the emptiness-doctrine, and their own teaching, which, on the contrary, insists throughout on the reality that underlies all pheno-

¹ An important distinction between Buddhists and Vedantists is that the former hold the world to have arisen from what is not, the latter form what is, the Sat or Brahman.

menal things, namely Brahman, and inculcates the duties which even this world of seeming imposes on all who are not yet in possession of the highest truth. That this phenomenal world has no exclusive right to the name of real is surely implied by its very name. Besides, whatever perishes can never have been real. If heaven and earth shall pass away ; if we see our body, our senses, and all that has been built up on them, decaying and perishing every day before our very eyes ; if the very Ego, the Aham, is dissolved into the elements from which it sprang, why should not the Vedantist also have held to his belief that Brahman alone is really real, and everything else a dream ; and that even the Nama-rupas, the words and things, will vanish with each Kalpa ?

To sum up, the Vedanta teaches that in the highest sense Creation is but Self-forgetfulness, and Eternal Life remembrance or Self-consciousness. And while to us such high abstractions may seem useless for the many, it is all the more surprising that, with the Hindus, the fundamental ideas of the Vedanta have pervaded the whole of their literature, have leavened the whole of their language, and form to the present day the common property of the people at large. No doubt these ideas assume in the streets a different garment from what they wear among the learned in the Asramas or the forests of the country. Nay even among the learned few stand up for the complete Advaita or Monism as represented by Samkara.

The danger with Samkara's Vedantism was that what to him was simply phenomenal, should be taken for purely fictitious. There is, however, as great a difference between the two as there is between Avidya and Mithyajnana. Maya¹ is the cause of a phenomenal, not of a fictitious, world ; and if Samkara adopts the Vivarta (turning away) instead of the Parinama (evolution) doctrine, there is always something on which the Vivarta or illusion is at work, and which cannot be deprived of its reality.

Ramanuja

THERE are schools of Vedantists who try to explain the

¹ In the only passage where the Sutras speak of Maya (III, 2, 3), it need not mean more than a dream.

Sutras of Badarayana in a far more human spirit. The best known is the school of Ramanuja, who lived in the twelfth century A.D.¹ If we place Samkara's literary activity about the eighth century², the claim of priority and of prior authority would belong to Samkara. But we must never forget that in India more than anywhere else, philosophy was not the property of individuals, but that, as in the period of the Upanishads, so in later times also, everybody was free to contribute his share. As we find a number of teachers mentioned in the Upanishads, and as they give us long lists of names, pupil succeeding teacher through more than fifty spiritual generations, the commentators also quote ever so many authorities in support of the views which they either accept or reject. Hence we cannot accept Samkara as the only infallible interpreter of the Vedanta-Sutras, but have to recognise in his commentary one only of the many traditional interpretations of the Sutras which prevailed at different times in different parts of India, and in different schools. A most important passage in this respect is that in which Samkara has to confess that others (*apare tu vadinah*) differ from him, and some, as he adds, even of our own (*asmadiyas cha kechit*)³. This allows us a fresh insight into the philosophical life of India which is worth a great deal, particularly as the difference of opinion refers to a fundamental doctrine, namely the absolute identity of the individual soul with Brahman. Samkara, as we saw, was uncompromising on that point. With him and, as he thinks, with Badarayana also, no reality is allowed to the soul (*Atman*) as an individual (*Jiva*), or to the world as presented to and by the senses. With him the soul's reality is Brahman, and Brahman is one *only*. But others, he adds, allow reality to the individual souls also. Now this is the very opinion on which another philosopher, Ramanuja, has based his own interpretation of Badarayana's Sutras, and has founded a large and influential sect. But it does not follow that this, whether heretical or orthodox opinion, was really first propounded by Ramanuja, for Ramanuja declares himself

¹ Wilson, *Works*, I, p. 35.

² I-tsing, *Introduction*, p. xv, 788-820 A.D.; Kumarila, 750 A.D.

³ S.B.E., XXXIV, p. xx, Thibaut.

dependent on former teachers (Purvacharyah), and appeals particularly to a somewhat prolix Sutra-vritti by Bodhayana as his authority. Ramanuja¹ himself quotes not only Bodhayana, but after him Tanka, Dramida (or Dravida), Guhadeva, Kapardin, Bharuchi. One of them, Dravida, is expressly said to have been anterior to Samkara, and so must Bodhayana have been, if he is meant by the Vrittikara whom Samkara himself criticises².

We ought, therefore, to look on Ramanuja as a perfect equal of Samkara, so far as his right of interpreting Badarayana's Sutras, according to his own opinion, is concerned. It is the same here as everywhere in Hindu philosophy. The individual philosopher is but the mouthpiece of tradition, and that tradition goes back further and further, the more we try to fix it chronologically. While Samkara's system is Advaita, i.e. absolute Monism, that of Ramanuja has been called Visisht-Advaita, the doctrine of unity with attributes or Monism with a difference. Of course with Ramanuja also Brahman is the highest reality, omnipotent, omniscient, but this Brahman is at the same time full of compassion or love. This is a new and very important feature in Ramanuja's Brahman, as compared with the icy self-sufficiency ascribed to Brahman by Samkara. Even more important and more humanising is the recognition that souls as individuals possess reality, that Chit and Achit, what perceives and what does not perceive, soul and matter, form, as it were, the body of Brahman³, are in fact modes (Prakara) of Brahman. Sometimes Chit is taken for the Supreme Spirit as a conscious cause, Achit for the unconscious effect or matter; but there is always Isvara as a third, the Lord; and this, originally Brahma, is later on identified without much ado with Vishnu, so that Ramanuja's sect is actually called Sri-Vaishnava. It assumed no doubt the greatest importance as a religious sect, as teaching people how to live rather than how to think. But to us its chief interest is its philosophical character, and more particularly its relation to the Badarayana-Sutras and Samkara's explanation of them.

¹ S.B.E., XXXIV, p. xxi. ² Deussen, *The Vedanta-Philosophy*, p. 31.

³ Colebrooke, *Misc. Essays*, I, 439 n.

Brahman, whether under the name of Isvara, Vishnu, or Vasudeva, or Bhagavat, is with Ramanuja as with Samkara both the efficient and the material cause of all that exists, and he is likewise the lord and ruler of the world. But here mythology comes in at once. From this Brahman, according to Ramanuja, spring Samkarshana, the individual soul (Jiva), from Samkarshana Pradyumna, mind (Manas), and from Pradyumna Aniruddha or the Ego (Ahankara). Brahma, masc., here called Vasudeva, is not without qualities, as Samkara holds, but possesses Jnana (knowledge), Sakti (energy), Bala (strength), Aisvarya (supreme power), Virya (vigour), and Tejas (energy) as his Gunas or qualities. Much more of the same kind may be found in Colebrooke¹.

The real philosophical character of Ramanuja's Vedantism has for the first time been placed in its true light by Professor Thibaut, from whom we may soon expect a complete translation of Ramanuja's own commentary on the Vedanta-Sutras, the Sribhashya. As, according to Ramanuja, Brahman is not Nirguna, without qualities, such qualities as intelligence, power, and mercy are ascribed to him, while with Samkara even intelligence was not a quality of Brahman, but Brahman was intelligence, pure thought, and pure being. Besides these qualities, Brahman is supposed to possess, as constituent elements, the material world and the individual souls, and to act as the inward ruler (Antaryamin) of them. Hence, neither the world nor the individual souls will ever cease to exist. All that Ramanuja admits is that they pass through different stages as Avyakta and Vyakta. As Vyakta, developed, they are what we know them to be on earth; as Avyakta they are enveloped (Samkochita). This involution takes place at the end of each Kalpa, when Brahman assumes its causal state (Karana-vastha), and when individual souls and individual things lose for a time their distinct and independent character. Then follows, by the mere will of Brahma, the evolution, or the new creation of gross and visible matter, and an assumption by the individual souls of new material bodies, according to the merit or demerit of their former existence. The

¹ Colebrooke, Misc. Essays, I, p. 439.

important point is that the individual souls, according to Ramanuja, retain their individuality even when they have reached the blissful abode of Brahman. The world is not considered by him as merely the result of Avidya, but is real, while Brahman is to be looked upon and worshipped as a personal god, the creator and ruler of a real world. Thus Isvara, the Lord, is not to be taken as a phenomenal god; and the difference between Brahman and Isvara vanishes, as much as the difference between a qualified and an unqualified Brahman, between a higher and a lower knowledge. Here we perceive the influence exercised on philosophy by the common sense or the common sentiment of the people. In other countries in which philosophy is, as it were, the private property of individual thinkers, that influence is far less perceptible. But extreme views like those propounded by Samkara were, as might be expected, too much for the great mass of the people, who might be willing to accept the doctrines of the Upanishads in their vagueness, but who would naturally shrink from the conclusions drawn from them with inexorable consistency by Samkara. If it is impossible to say, as Samkara says, 'I am not,' it is difficult at least to say, 'I am not I,' but 'I am Brahman.' It may be possible to say that Isvara or the Lord is Brahman; but to worship Isvara, and to be told at the same time that Isvara is but phenomenal, must be trying even to the most ardent of worshippers. If therefore Ramanuja, while professing his faith in the Upanishads and his allegiance to Badarayana, could give back to his followers not only their own souls, but also a personal god, no wonder that his success should have been so great as it was.

In the absence of any definite historical materials it is quite impossible for us to say whether, in the historical development of the Vedanta-philosophy at the time of Badarayana and afterwards, it was the absolute Monism as represented by Samkara that took the lead, or whether the more temperate Monism, as we see it in Ramanuja's commentary, exercised an earlier sway. There are certainly some Sutras which, as Dr. Thibaut has shown, lend themselves far more readily to Ramanuja's than to Samkara's interpretation. The question as to the nature of individual

souls seems decided by the author of the Sūtras in favour of Ramanuja rather than of Saṃkara. We read in Sūtra II, 3, 43, 'The soul is a *part* of Brahman.' Here the soul is clearly declared to be a part of Brahman, and this is the view of Ramanuja; but Saṃkara explains it by 'a part, as it were,' since Brahman, being not composed of parts, cannot have parts in the literal sense of the word.

This seems a bold proceeding of Saṃkara's; and though he tries to justify it by very ingenious arguments, Ramanuja naturally takes his stand on the very words of the Sūtra. Similar cases have been pointed out by Dr. Thibaut; and this very diversity of opinion confirms what I remarked before, that the Vedānta philosophers of India, though they look both on Upanishads and the Sūtras as their highest authorities, often present a body of doctrine independent of them; colonies, as it were, of thought that had grown to be independent of the mother-country, but are anxious nevertheless to prove that their own doctrines can be reconciled with the old authorities. This was the position assumed by Bādarāyana towards the Upanishads, so much so that nearly the whole of the first book of his Sūtras had to be devoted to showing that his own views of Brahman were not in conflict with certain passages in the Upanishads. Some of them may refer to the lower Brahman, some to the individual soul as one with Brahman; and it is on these points that, at a later time, Saṃkara and Ramanuja would naturally have differed. What was important for Bādarāyana to show was that no passages from the Upanishads could fairly be quoted in support of other philosophies, such as the Sāṃkhya, of which both Saṃkara and Ramanuja would disapprove. In the same manner both Saṃkara and Ramanuja are anxious to show that they themselves are in perfect agreement with Bādarāyana. Both, however, approach the Sūtras as if they had some opinions of their own to defend and to bring into harmony with the Sūtras. We can only suppose that schools in different parts of India had been growing up fast in the hermitages of certain teachers and their pupils, and that all were anxious to show that they had not deviated from such paramount and infallible authorities as the Sūtras and the Upanishads. This was done by means of

what is called *Mimamsa*, or a critical discussion of passages which seemed to be ambiguous or had actually been twisted into an unnatural meaning by important teachers.

Dr. Thibaut¹ therefore seems to me quite right when he says that both *Samkara* and *Ramanuja* pay often less regard to the literal sense of the words and to tradition than to their desire of forcing *Badarayana* to bear testimony to the truth of their own philosophical theories. This only confirms what I said before about the rich growth of philosophical thought in India, independent of *Sutras* and *Upanishads*, though influenced by both. Even if we admit that *Badarayana* wished to teach in his *Sutras* nothing but what he found in the *Upanishads*, it must not be forgotten that the *Upanishads* contain ever so many conflicting guesses at truth, freely uttered by thinkers who had no personal relations with each other, and had no idea of propounding a uniform system of religious philosophy. If these conflicting utterances of the *Upanishads* had to be reduced to a system, we can hardly blame *Samkara* for his taking refuge in the theory of a higher and a lower Brahman, the former being the Brahman of philosophy, the other that of religion, and both, as he thought, to be found in different parts of the *Veda*. By doing that he avoided the necessity of arguing away a number of purely anthropomorphic features, incongruous, if applied to the highest Brahman, and dragging down even the Brahman of the lower *Vidya* to a lower stage than philosophers would approve of. *Ramanuja's* Brahman is always one and the same, and, according to him, the knowledge of Brahman is likewise but one; but his Brahman is in consequence hardly more than an exalted *Isvara*. He is able to perform the work of creation without any help from *Maya* or *Avidya*; and the souls of the departed, if only their life has been pure and holy, are able to approach this *Brahma*, sitting on his throne, and to enjoy their rewards in a heavenly paradise. The higher conception of Brahman excluded of course not only everything mythological, but everything like activity or workmanship, so that creation

¹ S.B.E., XXXIV, p. xcvi.

could only be conceived as caused by Maya¹ or Avidya; while the very idea of an approach of the souls of the departed to the throne of Brahman, or of their souls being merged in Brahman, was incompatible with the fundamental tenet that the two were, and always remain, one and the same, never separated except by Nescience. The idea of an approach of the soul to Brahman, nay, even of the individual soul being a separate part of Brahman, to be again joined to Brahman after death, runs counter to the conception of Brahman, as explained by Samkara, however prominent it may be in the Upanishads and in the system of Ramanuja. It must be admitted therefore that in India, instead of one Vedanta-philosophy, we have really two, springing from the same root but extending its branches in two very different directions, that of Samkara being kept for unflinching reasoners who, supported by an unwavering faith in Monism, do not shrink from any of its consequences; another, that of Ramanuja, trying hard to reconcile their Monism with the demands of the human heart that required, and always will require, a personal god, as the last cause of all that is, and an eternal soul that yearns for an approach to or a reunion with that Being.

I am well aware that the view of the world, of God, and of the soul, as propounded by the Vedantists, whether in the Upanishads or in the Sutras and their commentaries, has often been declared strange and fanciful, and unworthy of the name of philosophy, at all events utterly unsuited to the West, whatever may have been its value in the East. I have nothing to say against this criticism, nor have I ever tried to make propaganda for Vedantism, least of all in England. But I maintain that it represents a phase of philosophic thought which no student of philosophy can afford to ignore, and which in no country can be studied to greater advantage than in India. And I go even a step further. I quite admit that, as a popular philosophy, the Vedanta would have its dangers, that it would fail to call out and strengthen the manly qualities required for the

¹ Ved. Sutras II, 2, 2, sub fine : Avidyapratyupasthapitanamarupamavyavasasena, 'Through being possessed of the Maya of names and forms brought near by Avidya.'

practical side of life, and that it might raise the human mind to a height from which the most essential virtues of social and political life might dwindle away into mere phantoms. At the same time I make no secret that all my life I have been very fond of the Vedanta. Nay, I can fully agree with Schopenhauer, and quite understand what he meant when he said,—‘In the whole world there is no study, except that of the original (of the Upanishads), so beneficial and so elevating as that of the Oupnekhat (Persian translation of the Upanishads). It has been the solace of my life, it will be the solace of my death.’

Schopenhauer was the last man to write at random, or to allow himself to go into ecstasies over so-called mystic and inarticulate thought. And I am neither afraid nor ashamed to say that I share his enthusiasm for the Vedanta, and feel indebted to it for much that has been helpful to me in my passage through life. After all it is not everybody who is called upon to take an active part in life, whether in defending or ruling a country, in amassing wealth, or in breaking stones; and for fitting men to lead contemplative and quiet lives, I know no better preparation than the Vedanta. A man may be a Platonist, and yet a good citizen and an honest Christian, and I should say the same of a Vedantist. They may be called useless by the busy and toiling portion of humanity; but if it is true that ‘those also serve who only stand and wait,’ then may we not hope that even the quiet in the land are not so entirely useless as they appear to be?

And while some of the most important doctrines of the Vedanta, when placed before us in the plain and direct language of the Vedanta-Sutras, may often seem very startling to us, it is curious to observe how, if clothed in softer language, they do not jar at all on our ears, nay, are in full harmony with our own most intimate convictions. Thus, while the idea that our own self and the Divine Self are identical in nature might seem irreverent, if not blasphemous, one of our own favourite hymns contains the prayer,—

And that a higher gift than grace
Should flesh and blood refine,
God's Presence and His very Self,
And Essence all-divine!

This is pure Vedanta. We also speak without hesitation of our body as the temple of God, and of the voice of God within us; nay, we repeat with St. Paul that we live, and move, and have our being in God, yet we shrink from adopting the plain and simple language of the Upanishads that the Self of God and man is the same.

Again, the unreality of the material world, though proved point by point by Berkeley, seems to many a pure fancy; and yet one of our most popular poets, the very type of manliness and strength, both mental and physical, speaks like a Vedantist of the shadows among which we move:

For more than once when I¹
Sat all alone, revolving in myself
The word that is the symbol of myself,
The mortal limit of the Self was loosed,
And passed into the Nameless, as a cloud
Melts into Heaven. I touched my limbs—the limbs
Were strange, not mine—and yet no shade of doubt,
But utter clearness, and thro' loss of Self
The gain of such large life as matched with ours
Were Sun to spark—unshadowable in words,
Themselves but shadows of a shadow-world.

It would be easy to add similar passages from Wordsworth, Goethe, and others, to show that after all there is some of the Indian leaven left in us, however unwilling we may be to confess it. Indian thought will never quite square with English thoughts, and the English words which we have to adopt in rendering Indian ideas are never quite adequate. All we can do is to strive to approximate as near as possible, and not to allow these inevitable differences to prejudice us against what, though differently expressed, is often meant for the same.

There is one more point that requires a few remarks.

Metaphors

It has often been said that the Vedanta-philosophy deals too much in metaphors, and that most of them, though fascinating at first sight, leave us in the end unsatisfied,

¹ Tennyson, *The Ancient Sage*.

because they can only illustrate, but cannot prove. This is true, no doubt; but in philosophy illustration also by means of metaphors has its value, and I doubt whether they were ever meant for more than that. Thus, when the Vedanta has to explain how the Sat, the Real or Brahman, dwells within us, though we cannot distinguish it, the author of the Chhandogya Up. VI, 13, introduces a father telling his son to throw a lump of salt into water, and after some time to take it out again. Of course he cannot do it, but whenever he tastes the water it is salt. In the same way, the father says, the Sat, the Divine, is within us, though we cannot perceive it by itself.

Another application of the same simile (Brihad. Ar. Up. II, 4, 12) seems intended to show that the Sat or Brahman, in permeating the whole elementary world, vanishes, so that there is no distinction left between the individual Self and the Highest Self¹.

Again, when we read² that the manifold beings are produced from the Eternal as sparks spring from a burning fire, we should remember that this metaphor illustrates the idea that all created beings share in the substance of the Supreme Being, that for a time they seem to be independent, but that they vanish again without causing any diminution in the Power from whence they sprang.

The idea of a creating as a making of the world is most repugnant to the Vedantist, and he tries in every way to find another simile by which to illustrate the springing of the world from Brahman as seen in this world of Nescience. In order to avoid the necessity of admitting something extraneous, some kind of matter out of which the world was shaped, the Upanishads point to the spider spinning its web out of itself; and, in order to show that things can spring into existence spontaneously, they use the simile of the hairs springing from a man's head without any special wish of the man himself.

Now it may be quite true that none of these illustrations can be considered, nor were they intended as arguments in

¹ See Deussen, Upanishads, p. 416, for a different explanation.

² Brih. Ar. Up. II, 1, 20.

support of the Upanishad-philosophy, but they are at all events very useful in reminding us by means of striking similes of certain doctrines arrived at by the Vedanta philosophers in their search after truth.

CHAPTER V

Purva-Mimamsa

It would be interesting to trace at once the same or very similar tendencies to those of the Vedānta in the development of other Indian philosophies, and particularly of the Sāṃkhya and Yoga, and to see what they have to say on the existence and the true nature of a Supreme Being, and the relation of human beings to that Divine Being, as shadowed forth in certain passages of the Veda, though differently interpreted by different schools of philosophy. But it seems better on the whole to adhere to the order adopted by the students of philosophy in India, and treat of the other Mimamsa, the Purva-Mimamsa, that is the Former Mimamsa, as it is called, in connection with the one we have examined. The Hindus admit a Purva-Mimamsa and an Uttara-Mimamsa. They look upon the Vedānta as the Uttara- or later Mimamsa, and on that of Jaimini as the Purva-, or prior. These names, however, were not meant to imply, as Colebrooke¹ seems to have supposed, that the Purva-Mimamsa was prior in time, though it is true that it is sometimes called Prachi², previous. It really meant no more than that the Purva-Mimamsa, having to do with the Karmakāṇḍa, the first or work-part of the Veda, comes first, and the Uttara-Mimamsa, being concerned with the Jñānakāṇḍa, comes second, just as an orthodox Hindu at one time was required to be a Grihastha or householder first, and then only to retire into the forest and lead the contemplative life of a Vanaprastha or a Sannyasin. We shall see, however, that this prior Mimamsa, if it can be called a philosophy at all, very inferior in interest to the Vedānta, and could hardly be understood without the previous existence of such a system as that of Bādarāyaṇa. I should not like, however, to commit myself

¹ Colebrooke, *Misc. Essays*, vol. i, p. 239. Ritter, *History of Philosophy*, vol. iv, p. 376, in Morrison's translation.

² Sarvādarsana-saṃgraha, p. 122, l. 3.

so far as to claim priority in time for the Vedānta. It has a decided priority in importance, and in its relation to the Jñāna-portion of the Veda. We saw why the fact that Bādarāyana quotes Jaimini cannot be used for chronological purposes, for Jaimini returns the compliment and quotes Bādarāyana. How this is to be accounted for, I tried to explain before. It is clear that while Bādarāyana endeavoured to introduce order into the Upanishads, and to reduce their various guesses to something like a system, Jaimini undertook to do the same for the rest of the Veda, the so-called Karmakāṇḍa or work-portion; that is, all that had regard to sacrifice, as described chiefly in the Brahmanas. Sacrifice was so much the daily life of the Brahmins that the recognised name for sacrifice was simply Karman, i.e. work. That work grew up in different parts of India, just as we saw philosophy springing up, full of variety, not free even from contradictions. Every day had its sacrifice, and in some respects these regular sacrifices may be called the first calendar of India. They depended on the seasons or regulated the seasons and marked the different divisions of the year. There were some rites that lasted the whole year or even several years. And as philosophy existed, independent of the Upanishads, and through Bādarāyana attempted to make peace with the Upanishads, we must consider that sacrifices also existed for a long time without the Brahmanas, such as we possess them; that they grew up without being restrained by generally binding authorities of any kind; and that at a later time only, after the Brahmanas had been composed and had acquired some kind of authority, the necessity began to be felt of reconciling variant opinions and customs, as embodied in the Brahmanas and elsewhere, giving general as well as special rules for the performance of every kind of ceremony. We can hardly imagine that there ever was a time in India when the so-called priests, settled in distant localities, did not know how to perform their own sacrificial duties, for who were the authors of them, if not the priests? But when the Brahmanas once existed, a new problem had to be solved: how to bring the Brahmanas into harmony with themselves and with existing family and local customs, and also how to discover in them a meaning that

should satisfy every new generation. This was achieved by means of what is called Mimamsa, investigation, examination, consideration. There is little room for real philosophy in all this, but there are questions such as that of Dharma or duty, including sacrificial duties, which offer an opportunity for discussing the origin of duty and the nature of its rewards; while in accounting for seeming contradictions and in arriving at general principles concerning sacrificial acts, problems would naturally turn up which, though often in themselves valueless, are generally treated with considerable ingenuity. In this way the work of Jaimini secured for itself a place by the side of the works ascribed to Badarayana, Kapila and others, and was actually raised to the rank of one of the six classical philosophies of India. It cannot therefore be passed over in a survey of Indian philosophy.

While Badarayana begins his Sutras with Athato Brahmajijnasa, 'Now therefore the desire of knowing Brahman,' Jaimini, apparently in imitation of it, begins with Athato Dharmajijnasa, 'Now therefore the desire of knowing Dharma or duty.' The two words 'Now therefore' offer as usual a large scope to a number of interpreters, but they mean no more in the end than that now, after the Veda has been read, and because it has been read, there arises a desire for knowing the full meaning of either Dharma, duty, or of Brahman, the Absolute; the former treated in the Uttara-, the latter in the Purva-Mimamsa. In fact, whatever Indian commentators may say to the contrary, this first Sutra is not much more than a title, as if we were to say, Now begins the philosophy of duty, or the philosophy of Jaimini.

Dharma, here translated by duty, refers to acts of prescriptive observance, chiefly sacrifices. It is said to be a neuter, if used in the latter sense, a very natural distinction, though there is little evidence to that effect in the Sutras or in the literature known to us.

This Dharma or duty is enjoined in the Brahmanas, and these together with the Mantras are held to constitute the whole of the Veda, so that whatever is not Mantra is Brahmana, whatever is not Brahmana is Mantra. The Brahmanas are said to consist of Vidhis, injunctions, and

Arthavadas, glosses. The injunctions are meant either to make us do a thing that had not been done before, or to make us know a thing that had not been known before¹. Subsequently the Vidhis² are divided into Utpatti-vidhis, original or general injunctions, such as Agnihotram juhōti, he performs the Agnihotra, and Viniyoga-vidhi, showing the manner in which a sacrifice is to be performed. The latter comprises injunctions as to the details, such as Dadhna juhōti, he performs the sacrifice with sour milk, &c. Then follow the Prayoga-vidhis which settle the exact order of sacrificial performances, and there is lastly a class of injunctions which determine who is fit to perform a sacrificial act. They are called Adhikara-vidhis.

The hymns or formulas which are to be used at a sacrifice, though they are held to possess also a transcendental or mysterious effect, the Apurva, are conceived by Jaimini as mainly intended to remind the sacrificer of the gods who are to receive his sacrificial gifts.

He likewise lays stress on what he calls Namadheya or the technical name of each sacrifice, such as Agnihotra, Darsapurnamasa, Udbhid, &c. These names are found in the Brahmanas, and they are considered important, as no doubt they are, in defining the nature of a sacrifice. The Nishedhas or prohibitions require no explanation. They simply state what ought not to be done at a sacrifice.

Lastly, the Arthavadas are passages in the Brahmanas which explain certain things; they vary in character, being either glosses, comments, or explanatory statements.

Contents of the Purva-Mimamsa

PERHAPS I cannot do better than give the principal contents of Jaimini's Sūtras, as detailed by Madhava in his Nyaya-mala-vistara³. The Mimamsa consists of twelve books. In the first book is discussed the authoritativeness of those collections of words which are severally meant by the terms injunction (Vidhi), explanatory passage (Artha-

¹ Rigvedabhashya, vol. i, p. 5.

² Thibaut, Arthasamgraha, p. viii.

³ See Cowell and Gough in their translation of the Sarvadarśana-samgraha, p. 178.

vada), hymn (Mantra), tradition (Smṛiti), and name (Namadheya). In the second we find certain subsidiary discussions, as e.g. on Apurva, relative to the difference of various rites, refutation of erroneously alleged proofs, and difference of performance, as in obligatory and voluntary offerings. In the third are considered revelation (Sruti), 'sign' or sense of a passage (Linga), 'context' (Vakya), &c., and their respective weight, when in apparent opposition to one another; then the ceremonies called Pratipathi-Karmani, things mentioned by the way, Anarabhyadhita, things accessory to several main objects, as Prayajas, &c., and the duties of the sacrificer. In the fourth the chief subject is the influence of the principal and subordinate rites on other rites, the fruit produced by the Juhu when made of the *Butea frondosa*, &c., and the dice-playing, &c., which forms parts of the Rajasuya-sacrifice. In the fifth the subjects are the relative order of different passages of the Sruti, &c., the order of different parts of a sacrifice, as the seventeen animals at the Vajapeya, the multiplication and non-multiplication of rites, and the respective force of the words of the Sruti, the order of mention, &c., as determining the order of performance. In the sixth we read of the persons qualified to offer sacrifices, their obligations, the substitutes for prescribed materials, supplies for lost or injured offerings, expiatory rites, the Sattrā-offerings, things proper to be given, and the different sacrificial fines. In the seventh is treated the mode of transference of the ceremonies of one sacrifice to another by direct command in the Vaidic text, others as inferred by 'name' or 'sign.' In the eighth, transference by virtue of the clearly expressed or obscurely expressed 'sign' or by the predominant 'sign' and cases also where no transference takes place. In the ninth, the discussion begins with the adaptation (Uha) of hymns, when quoted in a new connection, the adaptation of Samans and Mantras, and collateral questions connected therewith. In the tenth the occasions are discussed where the non-performance of the primary rite involves the 'preclusion' and non-performance of the dependent rites, and occasions when rites are precluded, because other rites produce their special results, also Graha-offerings, certain Samans, and various other things, as well

as different kinds of negation. In the eleventh we find the incidental mention and subsequently the fuller discussion of Tantra, where several acts are combined into one, and Avapa, or the performing an act more than once. In the twelfth there is the discussion on Prasanga, when the rite is performed with one chief purpose, but with an incidental further reference, on Tantra, cumulation of concurrent rites (Samuchchhaya), and option.

It is easy to see from this table of contents that neither Plato nor Kant would have felt much the wiser for them. But we must take philosophies as they are given us ; and we should spoil the picture of the philosophical life of India, if we left out of consideration their speculations about sacrifice as contained in the Purva-Mimamsa. There are passages, however, which appeal to philosophers, such as, for instance, the chapter on the Pramanas or the authoritative sources of knowledge, on the relation between word and thought, and similar subjects. It is true that most of these questions are treated in the other philosophies also, but they have a peculiar interest as treated by the ritualistic Purva-Mimamsa.

Pramanas of Jaimini

THUS if we turn our attention first to the Pramanas, the measures of knowledge, or the authorities to which we can appeal as the legitimate means of knowledge, as explained by the Purva-Mimamsa, we saw before that the Vedantists did not pay much attention to them, though they were acquainted with the three fundamental Pramanas—sense-perception, inference, and revelation. The Purva-Mimamsa, on the contrary, devoted considerable attention to this subject, and admitted five, (1) Sense-perception, Pratyaksha, when the organs are actually in contiguity with an object; (2) Inference (Anumana), i.e. the apprehension of an unseen member of a known association (Vyapti) by the perception of another seen member; (3) Comparison (Upamana), knowledge arising from resemblance; (4) Presumption (Arthapatti), such knowledge as can be derived of a thing not itself perceived, but implied by another; (5) Sabda, verbal information derived from authoritative sources. One sect of Mimamsakas, those who follow Kumarila

Bhatta, admitted besides, (6) Abhava, not-being, which seems but a subdivision of inference, as if we infer dryness of the soil from the not-being or absence of clouds and rain.

All these sources of information are carefully examined, but it is curious that Mimamsakas should admit this large array of sources of valid cognition, considering that for their own purposes, for establishing the nature of Dharma or duty, they practically admit but one, namely scripture or Sabda. Duty, they hold, cannot rest on human authority, because the 'ought' which underlies all duty, can only be supplied by an authority that is more than human or more than fallible, and such an authority is nowhere to be found except in the Veda. This leaves, of course, the task of proving the superhuman origin of the Veda on the shoulders of Jaimini; and we shall see hereafter how he performs it.

Sutra-style

BEFORE, however, we enter on a consideration of any of the problems treated in the Purva-Mimamsa, a few remarks have to be made on a peculiarity in the structure of the Sutras. In order to discuss a subject fully, and to arrive in the end at a definite opinion, the authors of the Sutras are encouraged to begin with stating first every possible objection that can reasonably be urged against what is their own opinion. As long as the objections are not perfectly absurd, they have a right to be stated, and this is called the Purvapaksha, the first part. Then follow answers to all these objections, and this is called the Uttarakpaksha, the latter part; and then only are we led on to the final conclusion, the Siddhanta. This system is exhaustive and has many advantages, but it has also the disadvantage, as far as the reader is concerned, that, without a commentary, he often feels doubtful where the cons end and the pros begin. The commentators themselves differ sometimes on that point. Sometimes again, instead of three, a case or Adhikarana is stated in five members, namely:

1. The subject to be explained (Vishaya).
2. The doubt (Samsaya).
3. The first side or prima facie view (Purvapaksha).

4. The demonstrated conclusion (Siddhanta); and
5. The connection (Samgati).

This is illustrated in the commentary on the first and second Sūtras of the *Mīmāṃsā*¹, which declares that a desire to know duty is to be entertained, and then defines duty (*Dharma*) as that which is to be recognised by an instigatory passage, that is by a passage from the Veda. Here the question to be discussed (*Vishaya*) is, whether the study of Duty in Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsā* is really necessary to be undertaken. The *Purvapaksha* says of course, No, for when it is said that the Veda should be learnt (*Vedodhiyetavyah*), that clearly means either that it should be understood, like any other book which we read, or that it should be learnt by heart without any attempt, as yet, on the part of the pupil to understand it, simply as a work good in itself, which has its reward in heaven. This is a very common view among the ancient Brahmins; for, as they had no written books, they had a very perfect system for imprinting texts on the memory of young persons, by making them learn every day a certain number of verses or lines by heart, without any attempt, at first, of making them understand what they learnt; and afterwards only supplying the key to the meaning. This acquisition of the mere sound of the Veda was considered highly meritorious; nay, some held that the Veda was more efficacious, if not understood than if understood. This was in fact their printing or rather their writing, and without it their mnemonic literature would have been simply impossible. As we warn our composers against trying to understand what they are printing, Indian pupils were cautioned against the same danger; and they succeeded in learning the longest texts by heart, without even attempting at first to fathom their meaning. To us such a system seems almost incredible, but no other system was possible in ancient times, and there is no excuse for being incredulous, for it may still be witnessed in India to the present day.

Only after the text had thus been imprinted on the memory, there came the necessity of interpretation or

¹ *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha*, p. 122; translation by Cowell and Gough, p. 180; *Siddhanta Dipika*, 1898, p. 194.

understanding. And here the more enlightened of the Indian theologians argue that the Vedic command 'Vedodhyetavyah,' 'the Veda is to be gone over, that is, is to be acquired, to be learnt by heart,' implies that it is also to be understood, and that this intelligible purpose is preferable to the purely mechanical one, though miraculous rewards may be held out for that.

But if so, it is asked, what can be the use of the Mimamsa? The pupil learns the Veda by heart, and learns to understand it in the house of his teacher. After that he bathes, marries and sets up his own house, so that it is argued there would actually be no time for any intervening study of the Mimamsa. Therefore the imaginary opponent, the Purvapākshin, objects that the study of the Mimamsa is not necessary at all, considering that it rests on no definite sacred command. But here the Siddhāntin steps forward and says that the Smṛiti passage enjoining a pupil's bathing (graduating) on returning to his house is not violated by an intervening study of the Mimamsa, because it is not said that, after having finished his apprenticeship, he should immediately bathe; and because, though his learning of the text of the Veda is useful in every respect, a more minute study of the sacrificial precepts of the Veda, such as is given in the Mimamsa, cannot be considered superfluous, as a means towards the highest object of the study of the Veda, viz. the proper performance of its commands.

These considerations in support of the Siddhānta or final conclusion would probably fall under the name of Samgati, connection, though I must confess that its meaning is not quite clear to me. There are besides several points in the course of this discussion, such as, for instance, the so-called four Kriyaphalas, on which more information is much to be desired.

Has the Veda a Superhuman Origin?

THIS discussion leads on to another and more important one, whether the Veda has supreme authority, whether it is the work of man, or of some inspired person, or whether it is what we should call revealed. If it were the work of a person, then, like any other work, it could not establish

a duty, nor could it promise any rewards as a motive for the performance of any duty; least of all, a reward in heaven, such as the Veda promises again and again to those who perform Vedic sacrifices. It follows therefore either that the Veda has no binding authority at all, or that it cannot be the work of a personal or human author. This is a dilemma arising from convictions firmly planted in the minds of the ancient theologians of India, and it is interesting to see how they try to escape from all the difficulties arising out of their postulate that the Veda must be the work of a superhuman or divine author. The subject is interesting even though the arguments may not be convincing to us. It is clear that even to start such a claim for any book as being revealed requires a considerable advance in religious and philosophical thought, and I doubt whether such a problem could have arisen in the ancient literature of any country besides India. The Jews, no doubt, had their sacred books, but these books, though sacred, were not represented as having been the work of Jehovah. They were acknowledged to have been composed, if not written down, by historical persons, even if, as in the case of Moses, they actually related the death of their reputed author. The Mimamsa philosopher would probably have argued that as no writer could relate his own death, therefore Deuteronomy must be considered the work of a superhuman writer; and some of our modern theologians have not been very far from taking the same view. To the Brahmans, any part of the Veda, even if it bore a human or historical name, was superhuman, eternal and infallible, much as the Gospels are in the eyes of certain Christian theologians, even though they maintain at the same time that they are historical documents written down by illiterate people, or by apostles such as St. Mark or St. John. Let us see therefore how the Mimamsa deals with this problem of the Apaurusheyatva, i.e. the non-human origin of the Vedas. Inspiration in the ordinary sense of the word would not have satisfied these Indian orthodox philosophers, for, as they truly remark, this would not exclude the possibility of error, because, however true the message might be, when given, the human recipient would always be a possible source of error, as being liable

to misapprehend and misinterpret such a message. Even the senses, as they point out, can deceive us, so that we mistake mother-of-pearl for silver; how much more easily then may we misapprehend the meaning of revealed words!

However, the first thing is to see how the Brahmans, and particularly the Mimamsakas, tried to maintain a super-human authorship in favour of the Veda.

I quote from Madhava's introduction to his commentary on the Rig-veda¹. He is a great authority in matters connected with the Purva-Mimamsa, having written the *Nyaya-mala-vistara*, a very comprehensive treatise on the subject. In his introduction he establishes first the authority of the Mantras and of the Brahmanas, both *Vidhis* (rules) and *Arthavadas* (glosses), by showing that they were perfectly intelligible, which had been denied. He then proceeds to establish the *Apaurusheyatva*, the non-human authorship of the Veda, in accordance, as he says, with Jaimini's Sūtras.

'Some people,' he says, and he means of course the Purvapakshins, the recognised objectors, 'uphold approximation towards the Vedas,' that is to say, they hold that as the *Raghuvamśa* of Kalidasa and other poems are recent, so also are the Vedas. The Vedas, they continue, are not without a beginning or eternal, and hence we find men quoted in them as the authors of the Vedas. As in the case of Vyasa's *Mahabharata* and Valmiki's *Ramayana*, Vyasa, Valmiki, &c., are known to be their human authors, thus in the case of the Kathaka, Kauthuma, Taittiriya, and other sections of the Veda, Katha, &c., are given us as the names of the authors of these branches of the Veda; and hence it follows that the Vedas were the works of human authors.

And if it were suggested that such names as Katha, &c., were meant for men who did no more than hand down the oral tradition, like teachers, the Purvapakshin is ready with a new objection, namely, that the Vedas must be of human origin, because we see in the Vedas themselves the

¹ See my Second Edition, vol. i, p. 10.

mention of temporal matters. Thus we read of a Babara Pravahani, of a Kusuruvinda Auddalaki, &c. The Vedas, therefore, could not have existed in times anterior to these persons mentioned in them, and hence cannot be prehistoric, pre-temporal, or eternal. It is seen from this that what is claimed for the Veda is not only revelation, communicated to historical persons, but existence from all eternity, and before the beginning of all time. We can understand therefore why in the next Sutra, which is the Siddhanta or final conclusion, Jaimini should appeal to a former Sutra in which he established that even the relation of words to their meanings is eternal. This subject had been discussed before, in answer to the inevitable Objector-general, the Purvapakshin, who had maintained that the relation between words and their meanings was conventional *thesai* established by men, and therefore liable to error quite as much as the evidence of our senses. For as we may mistake mother-of-pearl for silver, we may surely mistake the meaning of words, and hence the meaning of words of the Veda also. Jaimini, therefore, in this place, wishes us first of all to keep in mind that the words of the Vedas themselves are superhuman or supernatural, nay, that sound itself is eternal; and thus fortified he next proceeds to answer the objections derived from such names as Kathaka, or Babara Pravahani. This is done by showing that Katha did not compose, but only handed down a certain portion of the Veda, and that Babara Pravahani was meant, not as the name of a man, but as a name of the wind, Babara imitating the sound, and Pravahana meaning 'carrying along,' as it were *pro-vehens*.

Then follows a new objection taken from the fact that impossible or even absurd things occur in the Veda; for instance, we read that trees or serpents performed a sacrifice, or that an old ox sang foolish¹ songs fit for the Madras. Hence it is argued once more that the Veda must have been made by human beings. But the orthodox Jaimini answers, No; for if it had been made by man, there could be no injunction for the performance of sacrifices like the Jyotish-toma, as a means of attaining Svarga or paradise, because

¹ On Madryka, see Muir, Sansk. Texts, II, p. 452.

no man could possibly know either the means, or their effect; and yet there is this injunction in the case of the Jyotish-toma, and other sacrifices are not different from it. Such injunctions as 'Let a man who desires paradise, sacrifice with the Jyotishtoma' are not like a speech of a mad man; on the contrary, they are most rational in pointing out the object (paradise), in suggesting the means (Soma, &c.), and in mentioning all the necessary subsidiary acts (Dikshaniya, &c.). We see, therefore, that the commands of the Veda are not unintelligible or absurd. And if we meet with such passages as that the trees and serpents performed certain sacrifices, we must recognise in them Arthavadas or glosses, conveying in our case indirect laudations of certain sacrifices, as if to say, 'if even trees and serpents perform them, how much more should intelligent beings do the same!'

As, therefore, no flaws that might arise from human workmanship can be detected in the Veda, Jaimini concludes triumphantly that its superhuman origin and its authority cannot be doubted.

This must suffice to give a general idea of the character of the Purva-Mimamsa. We may wonder why it should ever have been raised to the rank of a philosophical system by the side of the Uttara-Mimamsa or the Vedanta, but it is its method rather than the matter to which it is applied, that seems to have invested it with a certain importance. This Mimamsa method of discussing questions has been adopted in other branches of learning also, for instance, by the highest legal authorities in trying to settle contested questions of law. We meet with it in other systems of philosophy also as the recognised method of discussing various opinions before arriving at a final conclusion.

There are some curious subjects discussed by Jaimini, such as what authority can be claimed for tradition, as different from revelation, how far the recognised customs of certain countries should be followed or rejected, what words are to be considered as correct or incorrect; or again, how a good or bad act, after it has been performed, can, in spite of the lapse of time, produce good or bad results for the performer. All this is certainly of interest to the student of Indian literature, but hardly to the student of philosophy, as such.

Supposed Atheism of Purva-Mimamsa

ONE more point seems to require our attention, namely, the charge of atheism that has been brought against Jaimini's Mimamsa. This sounds a very strange charge after what we have seen of the character of this philosophy, of its regard for the Veda, and the defence of its revealed character, nay, its insistence on the conscientious observance of all ceremonial injunctions. Still, it has been brought both in ancient and in modern times. So early a philosopher as Kumarila Bhatta tells us that the Mimamsa had been treated in the world as a Lokayata¹, i.e. an atheistic system, but that he was anxious to re-establish it as orthodox. Professor Banerjea² tells us that Prabhakara also, the other commentator of the Mimamsa, had openly treated this system as atheistic, and we shall meet with a passage from the Padma-Purana supporting the same view. However, there seems to be a misunderstanding here. Atheistic has always meant a great many things, so much so that even the most pantheistic system that could be imagined, the Vedanta, has, like that of Spinoza, been accused of atheism. The reason is this: The author of the Vedanta-Sutras, Badarayana, after having established the omnipresence of Brahman (III, 2, 36—37) by quoting a number of passages from the Veda, such as 'Brahman is all this' (Mund. Up. II, 2, 11), 'the Self is all this' (Chhhand. Up. VII, 25, 2), proceeds to show (III, 2, 38) that the rewards also of all works proceed directly or indirectly from Brahman. There were, however, two opinions on this point, one, that the works themselves produce their fruit without any divine interference, and in cases where the fruit does not appear at once, that there is a supersensuous principle, called Apurva, which is the direct result of a deed, and produces fruit at a later time; the other, that all actions are directly or indirectly requited by the Lord. The latter opinion, which is adopted by Badarayana, is supported by a quotation from Brih. Up. IV, 4, 24, 'This

¹ Lokayata is explained by Childers, s.v., as controversy on fabulous or absurd points, but in the Ambattha-Sutta, I, 3, it is mentioned as forming part of the studies proper for a Brahman.

² Muir, III, 95.

is indeed the great, unborn Self, the giver of food, the giver of wealth.' Jaimini, however, as we are informed by Badarayana in the next Sutra, accepted the former opinion. The command that 'he who is desirous of the heavenly world should sacrifice,' implies, as he holds, a reward of the sacrificer by means of the sacrifice itself, and not by any other agent. But how a sacrifice, when it had been performed and was ended, could produce any reward, is difficult to understand. In order to explain this, Jaimini assumes that there was a result, viz. an invisible something, a kind of after-state of a deed or an invisible antecedent state of the result, something Apurva or miraculous, which represented the reward inherent in good works. And he adds, that if we supposed that the Lord himself caused rewards and punishments for the acts of men, we should often have to accuse him of cruelty and partiality; and that it is better therefore to allow that all works, good or bad, produce their own results, or, in other words, that for the moral government of the world no Lord is wanted.

Here, then, we see the real state of the case as between Jaimini and Badarayana. Jaimini would not make the Lord responsible for the injustice that seems to prevail in the world, and hence reduced everything to cause and effect, and saw in the inequalities of the world the natural result of the continued action of good or evil acts. This surely was not atheism, rather was it an attempt to clear the Lord from those charges of cruelty or undue partiality which have so often been brought against him. It was but another attempt at justifying the wisdom of God, an ancient Theodicee, that, whatever we may think of it, certainly did not deserve the name of atheism.

Badarayana, however, thought otherwise, and quoting himself, he says, 'Badarayana thinks the Lord to be the cause of the fruits of action,' and he adds that he is even the cause of these actions themselves, as we may learn from a well-known Vedic passage (Kaush. Up. III, 8): 'He makes whomsoever he wishes to lead up from these worlds, do good deeds; and makes him whom he wishes to lead down from these worlds, do bad deeds.'

Atheism is a charge very freely brought against those who deny certain characteristics predicated of the Deity,


but do not mean thereby to deny His existence. If the Mimamsakas were called atheists, it meant no more than that they tried to justify the ways of God in their own way. But, once having been called atheists, they were accused of ever so many things. In a passage quoted by Professor Banerjea from a modern work, the *Vidvan-modatarangini*, we read: 'They say there is no God, or maker of the world; nor has the world any sustainer or destroyer; for every man obtains a recompense in conformity with his own works. Neither is there any maker of the Veda, for its words are eternal, and their arrangement is eternal. Its authoritativeness is self-demonstrated, for since it has been established from all eternity how can it be dependent upon anything but itself?' This shows how the Mimamsakas have been misunderstood by the Vedantists, and how much Samkara is at cross-purposes with Jaimini. What has happened in this case in India is what always happens when people resort to names of abuse rather than to an exchange of ideas. Surely a Deity, though He does not cause us to act, and does not Himself reward or punish us, is not thereby a non-existent Deity. Modern Vedantists also are so enamoured of their own conception of Deity, that is, of Brahman or Atman, that they do not hesitate, like Vivekananda, for instance, in his address on Practical Vedanta, 1896, to charge those who differ from himself with atheism. 'He is the atheist,' he writes, 'who does not believe in himself. Not believing in the glory of your own soul is what the Vedanta calls atheism.'

Is the Purva-Mimamsa a system of Philosophy?

Let me say once more that, in allowing a place to the Purva-Mimamsa among the six systems of Indian Philosophy, I was chiefly influenced by the fact that from an Indian point of view it always held such a place, and that by omitting it a gap would have been left in the general outline of the philosophic thought of India. Some Indian philosophers go so far as not only to call both systems, that of Jaimini and Badarayana, by the same name of Mimamsa, but to look upon them as forming one whole. They actually take the words in the first Sutra of the Vedanta-philosophy, 'Now then a desire to know Brahman,' as pointing back

to Jaimini's Sūtras and as thereby implying that the Purva-Mīmāṃsā should be studied first, and should be followed by a study of the Uttara-Mīmāṃsā afterwards. Besides, the authors of the other five systems frequently refer to Jaimini as an independent thinker, and though his treatment of the sacrificial system of the Veda would hardly seem to us to deserve the name of a system of philosophy, he has nevertheless touched on many a problem which falls clearly within that sphere of thought. Our idea of a system of philosophy is different from the Indian conception of a Darsana. In its original meaning philosophy, as a love of wisdom, comes nearest to the Sanskrit Jijñāsa, a desire to know, if not a desire to be wise. If we take philosophy in the sense of an examination of our means of knowledge (Epistemology), or with Kant as an inquiry into the limits of human knowledge, there would be nothing corresponding to it in India. Even the Vedānta, so far as it is based, not on independent reasoning but on the authority of the Śruti, would lose with us its claim to the title of philosophy. But we have only to waive the claim of infallibility put forward by Bādarāyaṇa in favour of the utterances of the sages of the Upanishads, and treat them as simple human witnesses to the truth, and we should then find in the systematic arrangement of these utterances by Bādarāyaṇa, a real philosophy, a complete view of the Kosmos in which we live, like those that have been put forward by the great thinkers of the philosophical countries of the world, Greece, Italy, Germany, France and England.





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